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Chapter I  
Introduction
1.1.Aim of the Study
The  aim  of  this  study  is  to  examine  US  policies  towards  the  South  African  labour 
movement through the American Federation of Labour - Congress of Industrial Organizations 
(AFL-CIO) and US official institutions, such as the State Department and the Labour Department 
of the United States, US universities etc. with particular focus on the period between the 1960s 
and mid-1970s. 
The reason for choosing such a research topic is the idea that the capitalist  classes of 
advanced  capitalist  countries  have  periodically  used  labour  organizations,  which  have  not 
opposed capitalist relations of production, to guarantee the profitability of their investments. In 
the post  Second World  War  period,  the  most  powerful  agent  in  the  implementation  of  such 
policies was the United States because of its huge production power and hegemonic position. 
These policies  always  followed the US investments  and aimed to create  labour organizations 
which would not oppose capitalist relations of production and US investments. These policies 
were introduced under the auspices of with the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions 
(ICFTU) in 1949 and continued with the establishment of the American Institute for Free Labour 
Development  (AIFLD)  in  1962  and  the  African  American  Labour  Center  (AALC)  in  1964 
following  the  expansion  of  US  investments  in  the  Latin  American  countries  and  African 
continent. Significantly, in parallel to the increase in US investments began in South Africa in the 
sixties, US overseas labour policies also intensified in the country through AFL-CIO, the US 
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State Department, and the US Labour Department. During the period, the AFL-CIO and official 
departments of US established important collaborative relations with the Trade Union Council of 
South Africa (TUCSA). Therefore, the study is shaped as a case study. In a word, in the study, 
the labour relations between the US and South Africa in the beginning of the 1960s and the 
middle of 1970s are examined by specifically focusing on TUCSA. 
1.2.Historical Background 
After  the  Second World  War,  the  world  economy was restructured.  The  fundamental 
reason of this restructuring was that the US, which had accumulated massive capital during the 
period between two world wars, sought to obtain a hegemonic position within the world capitalist 
system following 1945. At the same time, there were additional factors, which also played a 
significant role in the restructuring process of the world political economy. The existence of the 
Soviet Union as a representative of an alternative world order, political independence of former 
colonies, the establishment of socialist governments in East Europe were some examples of this 
situation. Such conditions, which constituted serious challenges to the legitimacy of capitalism, 
forced the US as the hegemonic power of capitalist system to create mechanisms to counter the 
risks.  The  first  of  such  attempts  was  the  formation  of  international  institutions  such  as  the 
International  Money  Fund  (IMF),  International  Bank  for  Reconstruction  and  Development 
(IBRD) and the General Agreement for Tariffs and Trade (GATT) that all them were aiming to 
ensure the continuation of capital accumulation under the leadership of the US (Glyn, 2006: 8; 
Peet, 2007: 39). 
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Nevertheless, these attempts were not enough to ensure capital accumulation around the 
world because,  especially in Western countries, the power of left  wing political  parties, anti-
capitalist social movements as well as of militant trade unions was increasing. In addition, these 
countries were also suffering from the problems in their capital accumulation process because of 
destructive  effects  of  the  Second  World  War.  Therefore,  the  second  attempt  became  the 
introducing  of  Marshall  Plan  by  the  US to  re-build  capitalist  relations  of  production  in  the 
Western European countries in 1947. The Plan also played a crucial role in the restructuring of 
the international labour movement (Block, 1978,  O’Brien, 535, Cox, 1971: 562). This process 
began with the formation of the ICFTU, after the breaking up of the World Federation of Trade 
Union (WFTU), in 1949. The WFTU had been established in 1945 under the leadership of British 
Trade Union Council (TUC), trade unions from the Soviet  Union and the CIO from the US. 
Under  the  WFTU  umbrella,  different  trade  union  understandings  and  political  lines  came 
together. For instance, the TUC was the supporter of British colonial policies while there were 
many socialist and communist trade unionists within the CIO. As for the influence of the Soviet 
Union, its labour organizations were the most influential agents in the WFTU. The aim in the 
formation of the WFTU was to create a working class international. However, because of the 
different ideological positions and policies in the organization,  some organizations,  especially 
British TUC, tried to have a dominant position within the WFTU. Despite all these efforts, the 
WFTU remained a leftist organization by taking a critical stance against capitalism as well as 
against the hegemony of the US because of the efforts of the Soviet Union (Southall, 1995: 36-
38; Wahl, 2007; Cooper, 1996). 
This situation led the US to evaluate the WFTU as a threat to its hegemonic position and 
capitalism since the most powerful country within the WFTU was the Soviet Union. Therefore, 
the US tried to undermine the WFTU by forcing the CIO and TUC to leave the organization and 
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by playing a leading role in the formation process of the ICFTU in 1949 (Southall, 1995). In the 
beginning process of the Marshall Plan, the WFTU had criticized it by arguing the US was trying 
to  undermine  independent  development  process  of  the  Western  European  countries.  Further, 
especially in Italy and France armed struggles and strikes had been organized against the Plan by 
trade unions affiliated to the WFTU (Tören, 2007). However, for the capitalist classes of these 
countries,  the Marshall  Plan was very vital  in order  to revitalize  collapsed production of the 
region. As result, under the cloud of dust of Marshall Plan discussions, the WFTU was broken 
and the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions was established as a new international 
labour organization under the leadership of the US. The TUC and the CIO also joined the ICFTU. 
Within  the  ICFTU,  two  main  tendencies  challenged  each  other:  The  anti  communist 
ideology of the AFL (after 1955 AFL-CIO) and social democratic stance of the unions in Europe. 
In addition to ideological differences, the ICFTU also witnessed rivalries between old and new 
hegemonic powers of the world capitalism, namely Britain and the US. The Britain, as colonialist 
power of the pre-war period was trying to protect its old position. The aim of the US was to 
guarantee the interest of its capitalist class especially in former colonies of Britain which relied 
upon the expansion of capital  accumulation  all  around the world.  Therefore,  during the post 
Second World War era, the US used a discourse of anti-colonialism to undermine British rule. 
These two powers also sought to have a dominant position within the ICFTU as they did in the 
world economy. However, this competition was gained by the US because of its huge economic 
and military power (Southall, 1995: 39-45). 
Another dimension of the restructuring of the labour movement was the overseas policies 
of the developed capitalist countries and the ICFTU to create anti-communist and pro-capitalist 
labour organizations in different regions where they had investments. For instance, in 1960, the 
ICFTU established the Inter American Regional Labour Organization (ORIT) in Latin America 
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in order to support non-communist and non-political trade unionism. The ORIT played a crucial 
role in this aim. In addition the US decided to launch its own independent labour program in 
Latin America by establishing the  American Institute of Free labour Development (AIFLD) in 
1961. Like ORIT, the AIFLD was also financed and directed by the AFL-CIO, USAID, CIA and 
business community of the US. The AIFLD played a crucial role in creating non-political, anti-
communist, pro-capitalist and pro-American labour organizations by supporting military coups 
against leftist governments, by undermining socialist political movements and by organizing / 
supporting paramilitary activities (Southall, 1995: 42; Thomson and Larson, 1978:22, Scipes, 10; 
Spalding, 1976:53). 
By the sixties, US investments began to increase in the African continent and US overseas 
labour policies aimed to create non-political, anti-communist trade unions in the region followed 
these investments. In fact, the US had not a previous existence in the continent. Therefore, firstly, 
it used the ICFTU to create non-political trade unions in the continent. However, in 1964, the US 
launched its independent overseas labour policies in Africa by establishing the African American 
Labour Center (Southall, 1995; Luckhardt and Wall, 1980; Meynaud and Salah-Bey, 1963). The 
Center, which had relationships with CIA, US governments and US business community, tried to 
spread ‘bread and butter’ and ‘business’ unionism, which suggests a narrow and non-political 
view of unionism, and which deals with the labour organizations as sectoral interest groups that 
should focus on economic issues throughout the world (Godfried, 1987; Luckhardt and Wall, 
1980;  Southall,  1995).  It  organized  many activities  from Botswana to  South Africa,  such  as 
meetings, education for unionists by using the money provided by US governments, CIA, USAID 
and US business community. It also took role in CIA operations in the region (Godfried, 1987; 
Luckhardt and Wall, 1980). 
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These activities found their counterpart in US relations towards South Africa. In other 
words, as in other regions and countries, when US investments began to increase in South Africa 
in the beginning of the sixties, overseas labour policies of the US in this country also intensified 
through the AFL-CIO and other US institutions. 
After the Second World War, the most important phenomenon in South Africa was the 
apartheid  administration.  Following  the  arrival  of  the  National  Party  in  power  in  1948,  the 
majority of South Africans were faced with a high level of oppression. In addition, during the 
apartheid era, South Africa witnessed important capital inflows; profits increases; and significant 
opportunities provided to white classes  to accumulate more and more capital. On the other side 
of the coin there were policies put into practice by the National Party government which led to 
serious  reductions  in  the   real  wages  of  black  workers   and  affected  their  living  conditions 
negatively (Innes, 1995: 211-224; Southall, 1995; Pampallis, 1995:211). 
The labour movement of South Africa also encountered a number of new developments. 
The first of these was the establishment of TUCSA in 1954. TUCSA assumed the role of the 
primary representative of industry based unions. At the same time, only registered trade unions 
were  accepted  as  members  by  TUCSA.  Although  it  described  itself  as  an  anti  apartheid 
organization (Imrie, 1979), it followed a discriminatory policy and excluded the blacks from its 
ranks. In 1962, it changed this policy and tried to organize black workers by forming an African 
Section. However, in 1967, the policy of the union altered and it excluded black workers again 
(Finnemore and Merwe, 1996:30; Southall, 1995). 
 On the other hand, the black working classes issued a robust response to discriminatory 
labour policies by establishing the South African Congress of Trade Unions (SACTU) in 1955. 
SACTU, as a first formal alliance between African unions and other races, played an important 
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role during the period with its political unionism perspective (Friedman, 1987:27; Lambert, 1988; 
Luckhardt and Wall: 1980). 
Another development within the South African labour movement was the formation of the 
Federation of Free African Trade Unions of South Africa, FOFATUSA in 1959 as an alternative 
African trade union federation to SACTU. The formation of the FOFATUSA was supported by 
the ICFTU, in which the US had a hegemonic position, in collaboration with TUCSA during the 
1960s. This was because SACTU’s understanding of political trade unionism and relations with 
antiapartheid powers was not acceptable to them. Therefore, they supported the FOFATUSA by 
financing it. The establishers of the FOFATUSA argued that their trade unionism understanding 
relied upon non-political trade unionism. However, the FOFATUSA had important relations with 
the  Pan  Africanist  Congress  (PAC)  which  was  a  nationalist  African  organization.  Not 
surprisingly the FOFATUSA never collaborated with SACTU because of its political stance but 
had  strong  relations  with  TUCSA.  Further,  when  the  TUCSA decided  to  admit  the  African 
workers,  some  member  unions  of  the  FOFATUSA  joined  the  TUCSA.  It  also  had  critical 
relations  with ICFTU and the US (Southall,  1995:  103;  Luckhardt  and Wall,  1980;  SADET, 
2006: 712). 
In 1960, the PAC organized a protest  against  the pass laws of apartheid.  The protest, 
ended in the shooting deaths of 69 and injuries of around 180 Africans. After Sharpeville, the 
African National Congress (ANC) and PAC were banned and the leaders of SACTU were forced 
into exile (Myers, 1980: 66; Mokoena 1993: 14). However, TUCSA remained untouched and 
kept  its  position  of being the  biggest  labour  organization  of the  country.  The Massacre also 
became a turning point in terms of international economic and political relationships of South 
Africa. After the Massacre, international actors started to pay greater attention to the nature of the 
apartheid regime. Many social movements, institutions and states in the world reacted strongly. 
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One of the reactions was the withdrawal of foreign investors from the country (Rogers, 1976: 
102). 
However, the United States had important relations with the white government of South 
Africa and these relations continued.  Additionally,  so many US firms,  who were marginal in 
South Africa before the Second World War realized new investments (Seidman and Seidman, 
1978:11).  During  the  sixties  and  seventies,  these  investments  revitalized  the  economy  by 
providing important technological know-how and developing new management methods (Rogers, 
1976:125; Seidman and Seidman, 1978: 88). Foreign capital and political relations between the 
US and South Africa provided important possibilities not just for the economy but also for the 
military capability of South Africa (Rogers, 1976: 102, Culverson, 1999: 40). 
Simultaneously, by the beginning of the 1960s, the leading organizations of the US labour 
movement, the AFL-CIO, and other official institutes attempted to extend their influence over the 
labour movement of South Africa, especially over TUCSA, just as they had done in different 
regions, such as Latin America and Europe after the Second World War. TUCSA was the most 
suitable trade union organization for the US to deal because of its ideological position and stance 
relying on the idea of business unionism. During the sixties and seventies, relations between the 
TUCSA and US labour/official organizations mentioned above ranged from information sharing 
about  economic  and  political  conditions  to  organization  of  educational  programs  for  trade 
unionists and black workers, to overseas visits, publication sharing, academic activities. All these 
policies  implemented  by  the  US  over  South  Africa  during  1960s  and  1970s  constitutes  the 
argument  of this thesis.  In other words, in the study,  it  is argued that US tried to shape and 
control the South African labour movement through AFL-CIO and other US institutions in order 
to support non-political and anticommunist trade unionism, and to ensure the profitability of its 
investments in South Africa. In addition, the TUCSA was the most suitable partner for US labour 
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operations in South Africa because of its anticommunist stance and obedience to bread butter 
unionism. 
1.3.The structure of the study 
The study is  composed  to  six  chapters.  Following  the  first  two chapters  devoted  for 
introduction and literature review, the developments of the post-Second World War era, such as 
the internationalization process of capital accumulation around the world, the cold war and the 
formation process of new international organizations, such as the IMF, the IBDR and the GATT 
are dealt with. The re-structuring process of the international labour movement under the cold 
war conditions and the development of overseas labour policies of the ICFTU and the AFL-CIO 
are also handled in this chapter.
In  the  fourth  chapter,  the  capitalist  development  process  of  South  Africa  in  the  post 
Second World War Era is discussed. The capital accumulation process under the apartheid and 
the developments within the labour movement, such as the formation of TUCSA, SACTU and 
FOFATUSA, are the main issues dealt with in this chapter. 
In the fifth chapter, US investments in South Africa between the beginning of the sixties and 
the mid seventies and the effects of these investments in the capital  accumulation process of 
South Africa are evaluated. 
In the last chapter, the main focal point of the study, US labour relations with South Africa 
between the 1960s and the middle of the 1970s will be focused on with particular reference to the 
relations  between  TUCSA and the  US labour  institutions  including  the  AFL-CIO and  other 
official organizations of the US. Among the basic focal points of the chapter there are overseas 
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visits, trade union training programmes, vocational education programmes and leader exchange 
programmes and information sharing.
As for the methodology of the study, a historical framework is developed by focusing on 
developments  in  international  scale  and  South  African  scale.  In  the  third,  fourth  and  fifth 
chapters,  extensive  literature  on  international  labour,  capitalist  development  of  South  Africa, 
labour history of South Africa and US investments in South Africa is given to elaborate the issue. 
The sixth chapter, which is the main chapter of the study, will be relied principally upon archive 
materials of TUCSA which are accessible in the Cullen Library. 
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Chapter II
Literature Review
2.1.Overseas Labour Programs in a General Context 
In the literature on international labour relations, foreign interventions by cold war powers 
into third world countries have been subject of many studies since the end of the Second World 
War. The focal point of these studies ranged from the ideological effects of foreign intervention 
policies  to  financial  aid,  to overseas  visits  of  the educational  organizations  of  interventionist 
powers aiming to organize labour activities from one country to another. Different assessments 
mostly derived from the varying  ideological  position of scholars.  Indeed,  the most  important 
determinant of the frameworks developed by the scholars paying attention to the issue was their 
ideological positions. Some scholars focused on the international labour policies implemented by 
developed  Western  capitalist  countries  in  different  regions  by  describing  them  as  labour 
imperialism, as  part of the hegemony strategy of American capitalism or as  a part of imperial  
relations. To be sure, one of the most important focal points of these studies was the negative 
effects of the activities of the US labour movement in collaboration with US governments and 
businesses. 
Some  scholars  concentrated  on  the  communist  risk  to  the  third  world  countries  and 
regarded the labour organizations of Western capitalist countries as the representatives of a free 
world.  Such  studies  focused  on  the  negative  effects  of  the  Soviet  Union  and  the  role  of 
communism  in  third  world  countries  defining  it  as  a  threat  to  the  freedom  of  third  world 
countries. In these studies, the authors who can be described as cold war social scientists, the US 
and  its  labour  movement  were  seen  as  attempting  to  prevent  the  negative  effects  of  Soviet 
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Union’s  policies.  However,  although the studies  conducted  by  cold war social  scientists just 
focused on the international labour policies of the Soviet Union and ignored the negative effects 
of the overseas programs of the US in general, some of them dealt with the issue within a broader 
framework and tried to examine the negative impacts of overseas programs in a more general 
context.  Nevertheless,  it  is  not  to  say  that  these  kind  of  studies  paid  equal  attention  to  the 
overseas program of the US and Soviet  Union. In contrast,  although they provided important 
explanations in terms of the negative effects of overseas program, the most dangerous agent of 
overseas labour policies was again the Soviet Union in their views.
2.1.1. Cold War Social Scientists
Four representatives of  the cold war social scientists,  Saposs, Steinbach,  Lichtblau and 
Windmuller  dealt  with the issue by focusing on the policies  of the Soviet  Union,  the World 
Federation  of  Trade  Unions  (WFTU)  and  the  social  conditions  in  third  world  countries. 
According to  Saposs (1966),  the Soviet  Union tried to have an influence  through WFTU by 
manipulating trade unions of third world countries and fanning anti Western ideologies in these 
regions. Additionally, he drew attention to their chaotic social conditions, such as anticolonialist 
hangover, xenophobia, poverty, disease and illiteracy on provoking bemused social thinking and 
a formless radicalism. Saposs stated that these events in the third world had provided suitable 
conditions for the policies of communist powers. In contrast, the aid policies of Western labour 
movements had functioned to solve the negative effects of these events (29-33). 
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Steinbach (1966) compared the two international labour organizations, the ICFTU and the 
WFTU by focusing on their  discourses and concepts.  In contrast  to  ICFTU, ICFTU rejected 
concepts such as class struggle, centralization and changing of the economic system (40). It saw 
the concept of class struggle as a reflection of Soviet Union policies which relied upon the idea of 
proletariat dictatorship. Moreover, communist powers, particularly the Soviet Union emphasized 
liberation from colonialism. This helped communist powers to come to power on the wave of 
nationalism (ibid, 40-41). 
Lichtblau  (1966) also  concentrated  on  the  policies  of  WFTU  and  underlined  the 
importance of WFTU originated from its position within the agenda of Soviet attempts to have an 
effect  on  the  political  atmospheres  in  countries  beyond  Soviet  influence,  particularly  in  the 
underdeveloped and ex-colonial regions. According to Lichtblau, the major objective of WFTU 
was  to  have  a  significant  role  in  the  political  and  social  reorganization  of  these  regions  by 
targeting particular groups, such as youth, students, professional groups, women etc. and to do 
these by combining special group’ interests with common political purposes. Anti-imperialism, 
peace, freedom of association, social welfare, anti capitalism and nuclear disarmament were some 
patterns of these political purposes. Because of the external aids and patronage policies of the 
WFTU,  Lichtblau argued, the Soviet Union was able to use its influence  power to create anti-
Western nationalist labour organizations (51-54). 
According to Windmuller (1963), even if British and French had tried to implement same 
policies later and even if the International Labour Organization (ILO), as an international labour 
body,  had been established in 1919, the most  important  and biggest  attempt  to affect  labour 
organizations was attempted by the Soviet Union in the interwar period. The most vital arms of 
the  Soviet  Unions’  policies  were  the  national  communist  parties  and  different  organizations 
operating in collaboration with the Soviet Union (ibid, 560). Windmuller also argues that the 
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Soviet Union was the only regime with a particular international labour policy, except for the 
colonial powers before World War II. However, towards the end of the war the larger triumphant 
powers including the United States targeted the reform of labour movements of the countries they 
occupied with armed powers. Moreover, labour policies made up a vital element of hegemony 
policies in Italy, Germany, Austria, Japan, Korea and Eastern Europe. In so much as that, the US 
government became more important agent for international labour after the Marshall Plan (ibid, 
563). According to Windmuller, the Soviet Union attempted to form a hierarchical communist 
society, by building up centrally directed state whilst the purpose of the Western powers was to 
establish  democratic  processes  through  the  liberation  of  unions  from  the  governments  and 
political parties. Policies aiming to improve the living standards of workers and increase in the 
income in these countries had also been supported by the Western powers (ibid, 571-572). 
Yet, they were ignoring the reality of the post-Second War period. This is because that in 
the period, the US, as a hegemonic power of the capitalist world economy, had also interests in 
applying international labour programs as well as the other programs, such as the Marshall Plan 
and Truman Doctrine.  Additionally,  these international  policies  had ideological  aims as well. 
However, the cold war social scientists never paid attention to the ideological dimension of these 
policies. In other words, according to them, Western labour movements definitely represented the 
voice of free world and functioned in favor of the working classes of third world countries as well 
as their own working class. As for Soviet Union, in their opinion, as a threat for the workers and 
the independence of third world countries, it was attempting to have political dominance in these 
regions  by  undermining  democratic  ideals.  This  was  because  the  Soviet  Bloc  and its  labour 
bodies were working with dogmatic ideologies such as class struggle and the dictatorship of the 
proletariat while the Western labour bodies had a non-ideological position. It is equally important 
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to  note  that  they ignored  the fact  of  an anti-colonial  discourse through different  propaganda 
methods used by the US to undermine other official labour bodies of the Western countries. 
Additionally,  although  they  claimed  that  the  Soviet  Union  exploited  the  poor  living 
conditions in the third world countries to agitate masses for communism, they never examined 
the  reasons  of  poor  living  conditions  existed  in  these  countries  or  the  relations  between  the 
capitalist  mode  of  production  and  bad  conditions  of  third  world  countries.  In  contrast,  they 
insisted that capitalist mode of production built up by the US in collaboration with its institutions 
in the third world countries would provide freedom and better living conditions to these countries 
whilst the Soviet Union was offering little more than propaganda. Such an approach to the issue 
derived from the ideological position of the cold war social scientists relying on the idea that the 
capitalist mode of production represents freedom while communism or non-capitalist opinions 
symbolize totalitarianism. 
Carlton (1959) developed a more comprehensive framework. He focused on the changing 
structure of the post second war era, the necessities of competition with communism and the role 
of  unions,  particularly  American  unions  in  this  process,  again  by  describing  the  communist 
countries as dictatorial  and the Western countries as the representatives of democratic  world. 
According to Carlton, after the Second World War, US economy had entered into a new stage, of 
which big corporations became one of the most important agents (278) At this time, tendency 
was in the direction of less unfairness in wealth and income. Therefore, Carlton pointed out that 
trade unions would become more and more beneficial to capitalism (ibid, 280). Accordingly, the 
roles of unions were significant to overcome the competition with communist countries. What 
was  necessary in  this  project  was  collaboration  between management  and labour  against  the 
totalitarian nations  (ibid, 281). In other words, the most important risk of the period was the 
question marks on the legitimacy of capitalism, and so the labour movements of US had to play a 
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leading  role  in  collaboration  with  the  business  community  and government.  In  addition,  the 
American unions had to promote the idea that the world would advance under capitalism because 
of the methods of US capitalism in combating poverty,  disease,  and ignorance.  Thus,  labour 
organizations, government and business community of US had to commit important tasks (ibid, 
282-283). The first task, Carlton suggested, was to convince the African and Asian countries that 
the free West was in support of freedom and democracy of African and Asian countries. In this 
regard, labour organizations of the free world might demonstrate that the free world aimed to 
guarantee better living conditions by struggling for more food, shelter, clothing, freedom, dignity, 
and education for  every part of the world (ibid, 283). In other words, Carlton argued that US 
trade unions should be a part of the cold war against the Soviet Union.    
2.1.2. The Critics of the Overseas Labour Policies Implemented in Latin 
America 
By  the  1960s,  the  discussions  over  the  overseas  labour  policies  went  beyond  the 
arguments  cited  above.  One of  the most  important  developments  of  the  period  was the  role 
played by multinational corporations because of the internationalization of capital starting from 
the end of the Second World War. In parallel, there were also some new developments within 
international labour movement. The first was that there were struggles for hegemony between 
different ideological positions within the Western bloc, in addition to the rivalries between the 
WFTU and the  ICFTU.  The second was  the  acceleration  and intensification  of  the  overseas 
labour  programmes  of  the  Western  capitalist  countries  in  Latin  America  and later  in  Africa 
because of the hegemony struggles mentioned above. Because of these new developments, many 
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scholars studying the international labour literature began to pay attention to the overseas labour 
programs of the Western capitalist countries and developed a critical framework by focusing on 
the negative impacts of these overseas labour programs.  
One of the common points of these studies was to concentrate on the financial resources 
devoted  by  the  donor  countries  to  these  overseas  programs.  They  also  concentrated  on  the 
activities and institutions organized by the labour organizations of capitalist western countries in 
the third world countries. Their focal point in explaining the rationale of overseas policies ranged 
from  internationalization  of  productive  capital  to  the  protectionism  of  developed  capitalist 
countries  to  the  establishment  of  US  hegemony  through  overseas  labour  programs.  Labour 
institutions, education and training programs and overseas visits were some examples of them. 
Another  common  point  was  to  examine  the  negative  impacts  of  activities  organized  by  the 
Western  capitalist  countries  in  the  name  of  labour  solidarity.  Some  scholars  highlighted  the 
ideological and anti-democratic dimensions of such activities while some of them tried to explain 
the interests of donor countries in implementing such kind programmes. However, it is significant 
to note that the most important common point of these studies was to be critical  of overseas 
labour policies of the Western capitalist countries.  
According to Olle and Scholler (1984), the main reason of overseas labour policies was 
the protectionism of national trade unions of developed capitalist countries because their basic 
aim was to save jobs by keeping investments at home. Olle and Scholler argued that after 1965, 
because of the internationalization  of productive capital  and the role played by multinational 
corporations, trade union internationalization was characterized by the protectionism of national 
trade unions. The policies of the AFL-CIO, the exaggerated protectionist standpoint of the West 
German and the British trade unions were some examples of this situation (ibid, 51-54). 
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Spalding (1976) concentrated on the effects of rapid globalization after the Second World 
War.  According  to  the  author,  rapid  growth  and  centralized  global  economy  dominated  by 
advanced capitalist countries of the world shaped the interventionist labour policies of developed 
capitalist  countries.  The most  important  agents  of such policies,  which aimed to  control  and 
manipulate the labour movements of the third world countries were the US business, labour and 
other private institutions. However, according to Spalding the aim of overseas policies was to 
ensure the capitalist mode of production (ibid: 45-46). 
Scipes  (2000)  compared  the  different  agents’  overseas  policies  of  the  AFL-CIO. 
According to Scipes, the characteristic of the traditional AFL-CIO overseas policy of the Meany 
and Kirkland regimes was the recognition of US domination in the third world countries. Meany 
and Kirkland had promoted the idea that the control of the world economy by US corporations 
was good for American workers.  Therefore,  alliances with the governments and corporations 
pursuing anti labour policies in the US were put into practice by them. However, his explanation 
in terms of the reasons of the overseas labour policies was similar to Spalding, and Olle and 
Scholler. Accordingly, the major aim of these policies, put into practice in the 1950s, 1960s and 
1970s  was  to  secure  the  investments  and  profitability  of  US  companies  by  supporting  pro-
American labour leaders, pro-capitalism policies and principles. The most important argument for 
these operations  was the  communist  threat  which  would allegedly  destroy freedoms (Scipes, 
2000: 5-9).  
Cox  (1971)  focused  on  production  relations  affecting  the  overseas  labour  policies 
internationally. After the Marshall Plan, national labour policies and the role of trade unions had 
gained major importance in Europe and many trade unionists had began to play a role in the 
determining process of national  economic policies  which relied upon the maintenance of full 
employment. Cox argued that some attempts to export this model to the less developed countries, 
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particularly to the Latin American countries, came to the agenda in the next period. To be sure, 
the most important agent of these attempts was the US (ibid, 561). According to Cox, since the 
1960s, US corporations had intensified their investments in ‘dependent’ countries, and this had 
led to appear new structural dynamics connecting industrial and labour interests in ‘metropolitan’ 
and ‘dependent’ countries (ibid, 576). In his later article, dated 1977,  Cox used the concept of 
hegemony developed by Gramsci to explain the overseas programs of AFL-CIO. Accordingly, a 
new structure relying on the concept of corporatist state had appeared in the US since the 1930s. 
One of the most important features of this new structure was the attached structure of labour to 
business administration and government (388). In other words,  American organized labour was 
an important supporter of the expansion of the American capitalism. From this point of view, Cox 
described the AFL-CIO as a soldier of American capitalism (ibid, 394-396). 
O’Brien  (2000)  defended  a  similar  approach.  However,  he  used  the  concept  of 
productivity to  emphasize  class  compromise  between  working  class  and  capitalist  class. 
According  to  O’Brien,  during  the  Cold  War  era,  the  majority  of  Western  unions  joined  the 
politics of productivity. According to the idea of politics of productivity, an appropriate technical 
organization  of  the  economy  would  generate  the  conditions  for  wealth  by  eradicating  the 
requirement  for  damaging  distributional  confrontations.  This  policy had  also an international 
dimension which relied upon the formation of international institutions and regimes in which 
domestic conciliation was supported. O’Brien borrowed the concept of 'embedded liberalism', 
which  was  first  described  as  the  compromise  between  a  liberal  international  economy  and 
national welfare by Ruggie. According to the compromise, US model would be extended around 
the  world  through  monetary  diplomacy,  the  Marshall  Plan,  and  hostility  to  leftist  parties 
(O’Brien, 2000: 537). 
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Haworth and Ramsay (1984) pointed out that colonial powers used their national labour 
bodies to manage and control embryonic labour organizations in their colonies by indicating the 
activities of AFL-CIO and CIA in Latin America (81). 
In terms of the negative effects of overseas labour policies, imperial, antidemocratic and 
elitist  character  of  these  policies  and  class  compromise  were  the  most  important  points 
highlighted by these scholars. For instance, Thomson and Larson argued that these centers were 
mainly  a  symbol  of  governments  and  few worker  movements  were  allowed  to  constitute  a 
democratic image and to make governments adequate for International Labour Organization’s 
technical aid funding. Moreover, the centers established by developed countries affiliated to the 
ICFTU as well as to their own national trade union centers. Therefore, they became a barrier for 
labour solidarity in different countries (Thomson and Larson, 1978: 36). Wedin (1984) also drew 
attention to the negative effects of the overseas labour policies in terms of their antidemocratic 
and  elitist  character.  Accordingly,  the  activities  of  AIFLD boosted  antidemocratic  and  elitist 
tendencies within the labour bodies, and made the democratization of labour movement more 
difficult (ibid: 24-29). The same point was also highlighted by Spalding (1976). In addition, he 
pointed out that  the influence of US labour movement  had to be examined within the larger 
framework of imperialism. In other words, institutions, such as universities, government agencies 
like the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), and clandestine policy 
bodies like CIA had to be covered by the studies seeking to understand the  role of US labour 
(ibid, 46). 
Press (1984) focused on the concept of class compromise, the antidemocratic nature of 
overseas  labour  policies  and  bureaucratization  process  in  labour  movements  as  a  result  of 
overseas labour policies. According to the author, one of the key actors formulating these policies 
was  the  full  time  officers  of  these  organizations,  because  of  the  structure  of  these  regional 
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organizations relying upon an oligarchic process within the labour organizations. Press also stated 
that  the  activities  of  international  unions  were  shaped  by  those  organizations.  Therefore, 
participatory democracy was absent altogether in the international organizations. Press underlined 
the fact  that  this  enforced the limits  of international  trade unionism and created international 
organizations that were more vulnerable in terms of national or regional capitals’ policies leading 
to negative external effects. Furthermore, even if global industrial restructuring produced a more 
solid  basis  for  labour  to  internationalize  its  struggles,  the  international  institutions  of  labour 
functioned to state the accommodation of working class with capital, rather than proposing any 
instrument to go beyond the class compromise (ibid, 102).
2.1.3. The Influence of US Overseas Policies in the African Continent 
In comparison to Latin American countries, the African continent received less attention 
from US labour organizations.  Nevertheless, some academics tried to understand the relations 
between US labour and labour movements of African countries. 
One of them, Godfried (1987), focused on the trade union education issue in the third 
world  countries,  with  particular  reference  to  the  African  continent.  Using  the  concept  of 
‘corporatism’, Godfried (1987) argued that after the Second World War, the US organized labour 
movement and international labour institutions manipulated by the US tried to form 'bread and 
butter'  and 'business’ unionism in developing countries.  In a word, the internationalization of 
American capitalism was endorsed by the AFL-CIO and the other unions of the US by focusing 
on the distribution issue. The basic aim of these policies was to spread American corporatism in 
the third world. Godfried mainly dealt with the education programs of the AALC with particular 
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reference to the years between 1965 and 1971 (ibid,  55).  Godfried also stated that American 
labour, capital and the state cooperated with each other to create, encourage and operate pro-US 
foreign policy institutes and this derived from the corporatist structure dominant in the US labour 
relations (ibid, 59).
Another scholar, Yevette (1998) concentrated on the overseas policies of the US in the 
African continent and dealt with the issue by focusing on the relations between African-American 
labour leaders  working together  with the AFL-CIO and African labour leaders.  According to 
Yevette, because  of  the  common  ethnic  and  cultural  familiarities,  Africans  and  African-
Americans might work together for some common goals. However, such kind relations had never 
been experienced between African and white  labour  leaders (ibid,  3).  Yevette  stated that  the 
position  of  African-American  labour  leaders  was  strongly  anti-communist  because  of  their 
citizenship within a nation which directed many countries to fight against communism. Some 
parts of African labour, resented the inadequacies the ICFTU and attempted to form relations 
with the AFL-CIO and the AFL-CIO benefited from this situation by giving economic aid to 
strikers, labour and political activists in Africa (ibid, 9).
As for South Africa, although there has previously been extensive study on relationships 
between the United States and South Africa with particular reference to political and economic 
relations, the relations between international labour organizations and the South African labour 
received little attention in comparison with the many countries in Latin America. This situation 
was also spotlighted by Eddie Webster. In his study, dated 1984, Webster pointed out that “the 
role of international trade unionism in the development of black worker organizations in South 
Africa was a subject that received little attention (177)”. Indeed, although, many academics and 
researchers  devoted  some chapters  of  their  studies  to  the issue,  only a  few of  them directly 
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focused on the relations between international labour movement and the South African labour 
movement or the overseas policies of the US in South Africa. 
In their work focused on the investments of multinational corporations in South Africa, 
Seidman and Seidman (1977) dealt with the policies of the AALC and the AFL-CIO, and stated 
that the formation of the AALC followed the increase of US investments in the Southern Africa. 
According  to  Seidman  and  Seidman,  the  AALC’s  function  did  not  aim  to  activate  African 
workers against apartheid but to have an effect on African struggle to ensure the status quo (ibid, 
119). 
Luckhardt and Wall (1980) also dealt with the issue of international labour relations of the 
South African labour movement.  Actually,  their  work focused on the history of the SACTU. 
Therefore, main concern of the study with regard to international labour issue was to examine the 
international relations of the SACTU with the WFTU, the ICFTU, and the ILO. These authors 
also  displayed  important  patterns  of  hegemonic  international  labour  relations.  Luckhardt  and 
Wall  pointed  out  that  the  SACTU always  tried  to  find support  from all  international  labour 
organizations.  Therefore,  it  formed  relations  with  the  ICFTU and  the  WFTU.  However,  the 
ICFTU,  the  South  African  labour  organizations  backed  by  the  ICFTU,  the  SATUC  (later 
TUCSA)  and  the  FOFATUSA,  had  not  given  support  SACTU’s  struggle  against  apartheid, 
although they criticized apartheid in words (ibid). 
Webster (1984) also handled the  imperial  relationship between the International Metal 
Workers Federation  (IMF) and the emerging  unions  in  the 1970s in  South Africa.  The IMF 
worked with the status quo by not supporting the establishment  of independent black worker 
unions until  the Durban strikes waves in the middle of 1970s. However,  after  the strikes,  its 
policies changed and it began to support black unions (ibid, 227). Although he provided a very 
useful framework for comprehending the role played by the IMF in South Africa, Webster did 
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not aim to deal with the imperial  labour relations comprehensively,  but focused on a specific 
case. 
As  stated  above,  many  scholars  studying  on  the  history  of  the  South  African  labour 
movement  devoted  a  chapter  or  wrote  up the  articles  on  the  issue,  but  only a  few of  them 
concentrated on all the issue comprehensively. The two studies conducted by  Trewhela (1991) 
and Southall (1995) developed a broad framework with regard to the issue is among these few 
studies. 
Trewhela  (1991)  mainly focused  on the anti-communist  policies  of  the AALC in the 
Southern Africa, the relations between the AALC and the CIA, the contacts between the white 
and  non-political  unions  in  South  Africa  and  the  AALC,  and  pointed  out  that  before  the 
formation  of  the  AALC,  the  US had developed an anticommunist  policy framework  for  the 
African continent. Nevertheless, after the foundation of the AALC, these policies became more 
obvious. This was because that  the idea in the formation of the AALC was to vaccinate  the 
working class movement against radicalism and to guide it in a way accepted by the American 
administration  (ibid,  74).  Trewhela  also  argued  that,  especially  in  the  1960s  and 1970s,  the 
AALC had worked in collaboration with the white  and ‘de facto’  racist  trade union in South 
Africa,  the TUCSA, and with  anti-communist,  anti-SACTU black  trade  unionists.  Moreover, 
Trewhela argued that the AFL-CIO and the ICFTU had supported  the  racist  policies  in  this 
period. On the other hand, after the Durban strikes, the AALC and the AFL-CIO changed their 
policies (ibid, 81-82). 
Southall  (1995) also dealt  with the international  relations  of the South African labour 
movement  and  argued  that  WFTU  developed  a  comparatively  unified  face  to  the  world. 
However,  Southall  maintained,  Western  labour  organizations  composed  a  combination  of 
national trade union tendencies. In a word, on the Western side, there were different positions 
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ranging from the conservative position of the AFL-CIO to the left wing leaning supporters of 
social  democracy  within  European trade  unions  (Southall,  1995:  27).  According  to  Southall, 
while before the 1970s, the relations between South African labour movement and international 
labour organizations relied heavily upon a kind of labour imperialism, after the re-appearance of 
black trade unionism in the middle of the 1970s, solidarity started to replace labour imperialism 
(ibid, 360). 
2.2.Different  Perspectives  Regarding  the  Trade  Union  Council  of  South 
Africa (TUCSA)
Even if the TUCSA has received little attention from scholars dealing with the labour 
history of South Africa in comparison with the other labour organizations of the country such as 
SACTU and COSATU, those who have studied the policies of TUCSA put forward different 
arguments. Some of them have directly charged the federation as an example of racist and pro-
apartheid trade unionism, whilst others tried to understand its policies by focusing on the changes 
in the labour process of the country in the sixties. Nevertheless, almost all scholars dealing with 
TUCSA have accepted that it was a conservative, non-political and pragmatic union.
Luckhardt and Wall argued that the TUCSA had followed the policies of the apartheid 
government and kept out African trade unions from its ranks. Besides, it had also chosen to be in 
opposition  to  SACTU rather  than  the  apartheid  regime  (Luckhardt  and  Brenda  Wall,  1980). 
According to  Luckhardt and Wall, the main concern for TUCSA was to protect white workers 
from the competition of unorganized and cheap African labour. On the other hand, TUCSA had 
preferred  to  display  a  paternalistic  and  opportunistic  attitude  towards  the  African  workers 
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(Luckhardt  and  Wall,  1980).  Similar  to  Luckhardt  and  Wall, also  for  Baskin,  TUCSA was 
enormously antagonistic to SACTU as well as the ANC and had reacted weakly against the racial 
legislation of the apartheid government during the 1950s and 1960s. Although, Baskin pointed 
out that TUCSA was against the racial separation in words, in fact, it had properly fit with the 
apartheid practices by pushing out African unions from its ranks (Baskin, 1991: 160).
 Lipton approached to the issue by looking at the history of relations between the white 
and black working classes of the country and highlighted that “white workers actively promoted 
many apartheid policies, particularly the job bar which gave them a monopoly on skilled jobs and 
preferential employment in other jobs (Lipton, 1986: 184)”. Nevertheless, according to Lipton, 
the following separation of the working class generated problems for white workers as well. As 
for TUCSA, Lipton pointed out that in general, the members of the council were conservative and 
its main concern was the economic disadvantage of its members (ibid, 194-195).  Godfried also 
argued that TUCSA had hesitated to count black unions within its ranks. Moreover, Godfried 
maintained that the council might take into account black unions only if such a policy would 
provide  advantage  to  its  white  members  (Godfried,  1987:  57).  Steinhardt  also  described  the 
TUCSA as a racialist union by arguing “in the early 1970s, a spontaneous revival of trade union 
activity within South Africa challenged the racialist principles of TUCSA” (Steinhart, 1988: 1). 
According to Webster,  on the other hand, the TUCSA was “the only pro capitalist  moderate 
union  grouping with  black  membership”  (Webster,  1995:  273).  Southall  highlighted  that  the 
establishment of the TUCSA in effect had backed apartheid into the trade union field (Southall, 
1995: 52).
To be sure, there were different positions taken by different scholars with regard to the 
TUCSA. For instance, Peter Alexander (2000) pointed out that although the TUCSA tried to form 
some  relations  with  pro-apartheid  unions,  these  attempts  were  not  successful.  Although  for 
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Alexander, it was possible to criticize the TUCSA for abandoning the African unions and for the 
weakness  of  its  resistance  to  the  job reservation,  this  author  did  not  agree  with Lipton  who 
described the union as pro-apartheid trade union (125). 
Crankshaw (1987) focused on the relations between the labour process and the ethnically 
exclusive trade union policies accepted by some unions within the TUCSA during the sixties. His 
argument was that the relations of production represented in a specific labour process shape the 
broad  limits  within  which  certain  kind  of  trade  union  strategies  could  be  efficiently  used. 
However, Crankshaw suggested that many non-class or political and ideological relations were 
important in determining the result of trade union struggles. The supply of labour, government 
legislation,  the  nationalist/racist  position  of  white  union  members,  the  structure  of  state,  the 
executive structure of trade unions, the relations between trade union leaders and its members 
and trade union ideology were some examples of this (1-10). According to Crankshaw, TUCSA 
had tried to organize cheap African labour to prevent the undercutting of white workers by cheap 
African labour power. However, Crankshaw stated that state and right wing trade unions opposed 
these attempts. The labour process and the racial division of labour were other reasons for the 
conflicts  within  TUCSA (ibid,  19-21).  In  his  later  article,  Crankshaw (1990)  dealt  with  the 
TUCSA by focusing on the building industry. According to the author, after the time economic 
expansion of the sixties, the undercutting process of skilled white workers by cheaper and less 
skilled African labour had speeded up. Therefore, the policies of the apartheid government to 
maintain the segregation of cheap labour had become more important for white workers (1). At 
the period, TUCSA had opposed the policy of job reservation. However, because of this stance of 
it many affiliated unions started to withdraw from its ranks (ibid, 10-15). Therefore, it was not the 
pro-apartheid  nature  of  the  union federation,  but  different  dynamics,  such  as  demands  of  its 
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members, the policies of the apartheid government had played a significant role in the shaping 
process of TUCSA’s policies.
 Clercq (1979) also approached to the issue by dealing with the demands of white workers 
and argued that during the 1950s and 1960s, the main aim of many South African trade unionists, 
especially who those worked within the TUCSA was to ensure and enhance the benefits of their 
members.  According to Clercq,  even if they announced that their  purpose was to incorporate 
African workers,  the unions working within the ranks of TUCSA took actions for their  self-
interests, which were effective for TUCSA’s policies (72-74). 
Coupe  (1995)  also  concentrated  on  the  position  taken  by  the  white  workers  and 
production relations of the post Second World War era in South Africa. In this study,  Coupe 
stated that the post Second World War political economy of South Africa had witnessed clashes 
around the role of white labour. Besides, because of the development of mechanized production 
relations, the most important matter for white labour had been the continuation of the industrial 
colour bar. According to Coupe, “TUCSA was ill-equipped to take the plunge into radical trade 
unionism (ibid, 467)”.
According to Imrie (1979), who was a leading member of TUCSA, and who provided an 
official  history  of  the  TUCSA;  the  union  was  one  of  the  few patterns  of  the  organizations 
mirroring  real  and triumphant  collaboration  between different  ethnic  groups.  In  other  words, 
Imrie  argued  that  TUCSA  had  been  created  by  workers  coming  from  different  races  and 
economic conditions and even if it had faced with pressures from the left-wing, the right-wing 
and  its  own  members,  it  might  take  a  position  on  the  centre  of  the  political  sphere  (1-2). 
However, in the next pages of her study, Imrie revealed that TUCSA had held a political stance 
on  slightly  right  of  centre  but  because  of  TUCSA’s  antagonism  to  apartheid,  it  had  been 
identified for many times as ‘left-wing’ (ibid, 50). Imrie also revealed that the main focal points 
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of the union were the bread and butter or economic matters, including wages, prices, working 
conditions, inflation and taxation issue, pensions, housing, transport. However, because of the 
apartheid policies of government, it was not able to realize all of its aims (54). 
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Chapter III
A General Review of the Post Second World War Era
3.1.Restructuring of Capital Accumulation Process Around the World 
After  the  Second World  War,  the  world  economy was restructured.  The  fundamental 
cause of this phenomenon was that the US, which accumulated massive capital during the period 
between two world wars, had huge production power. At the end of the Second World War, its 
economy had a growing market, great productive capacity and a strong currency. For example, it 
had three-quarters of the world’s existing monetary gold. In 1950, it produced about 60 percent of 
the total  output of the biggest  seven capitalist  countries.  Its manufacturing industry was two, 
three and nine times more productive than the manufacturing industries in following countries 
respectively UK, Germany and Japan.  In addition,  all  these combined with its  huge military 
power (Glyn, 2006: 8; Peet, 2007: 39). 
Additional  factors  also  changed  the  global  landscape,  such  as  the  advance  to  political 
independence by countries which were colonies in the past, the existence of the Soviet Union as a 
representative of an alternative world order, the increasing influence of social democratic and 
socialist  parties  in the Western Europe and the establishment  of socialist  governments  in the 
Eastern  Europe.  Another  factor  affecting  the  economic  and political  atmosphere  of  the  post 
Second World War period was Western European countries’ economic problems. First of all, in 
these countries,  production had decreased sharply from prewar levels.  The scarcity of certain 
goods,  work  force  shortages,  displaced  people,  and  the  collapse  of  transportation  and 
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communication systems as well as of trade were among other economic problems. In 1946 and 
1947, the shortage of coal, which was the most important energy source of the Western Europe, 
also affected production negatively (Block, 1978: 77). In addition, before the Second World War, 
trade  relations  between  the  two  parts  of  Europe  were  very  intensive.  However,  after  the 
establishment  of socialist  governments  in the Eastern European countries,  trade between two 
regions sharply fell down and this made important contribution to the economic problems in the 
Western side (Block, 1978: 77). 
In Western Europe, since the thirties, right wing policies and politicians had lost their 
credibility because of their economic failures and their widespread collaboration with fascism in 
the thirties. However, leftist parties had gained an important prestige because of their struggles 
against fascism. Economic and social conditions of the post war period also strengthened the 
legitimacy of leftist policies and led left political movements to gain popularity. As a result of the 
popularity of leftist political movements, strong demands for social reforms and social justice, 
brought to the agenda by trade unions and leftists parties, became one of the most important 
element of the Western European political atmosphere (Block, 1978:78). 
Such conditions forced the US, as the hegemonic power of the world capitalist system, to 
create mechanisms to counter the risks which were required to sustain global capitalism. The first 
attempt  was  the  establishment  of  international  institutions  and  regulations,  such  as  the 
International Money Fund (IMF), the International Bank for Development and Reconstruction 
(IBDR) and the General Agreement for Trade and Tariffs (GATT), to ensure the continuation of 
capital  accumulation  process  under  the  leadership  of  the  US.  In  fact,  the  Bretton  Woods 
Conference, of which outcomes were the establishment of the IMF and the IBRD in 1944, and 
the GATT in 1947, was a mutual plan of the US and Britain. However, the US dominated the 
conference  and  directed  it  to  the  line  of  its  national  interests  benefiting  from the  economic 
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weakness of Britain. By doing so, the US was able to establish a hegemonic monetary order 
centered on the dollar. This also meant that the world leadership of Britain ended whilst the US 
emerged as new hegemonic power (Peet, 2007: 39, 53).
The  other  attempt  of  the  US  to  ensure  continuation  of  capitalist  system  was  the 
introducing of the Marshall Plan, which aimed to strength capitalist production relations in the 
Western European countries. During the period, in addition to the problems mentioned above, 
one of the most important economic problems of the Western European countries was the deficit 
in dollar reserves because of collapsed production and export opportunities in these countries. 
This  was  also  an  obstacle  for  a  multilateral  trade  between  the  US  and  Western  European 
countries. In other words, the persistence of difficulties of the Western European countries in 
earning dollars might lead to strict controls on foreign trade and exchange on dollar imports in 
these  countries  and  this  would  mean  that  the  US  could  lose  an  important  market  for  its 
overproduction.  Additionally,  the Western European countries’ economic and social  problems 
might  lead to communists  coming to power.  Therefore,  the US provided financial  support  to 
vitalize  their  economies  in  a  U.S.-dominated  multilateral  world  economy.  This  project  was 
realized in two steps: to enhance the Western Europe’s capacity to earn dollars by increasing 
export and expanding US private investments in the region. In other words, private sector or US 
business would play a significant role in the process (Block, 1978: 88-89). The second dimension 
of the Marshall Plan was to create an anticommunist political atmosphere. Under the Marshall 
Plan discussions and implementations in the Western European countries, different institutions 
were established, communists and leftists were suppressed, military capacities were strengthened, 
private  capital  flows from the US to the Western Europe was encouraged,  and all  economic 
policies were regulated in favor of multilateral and liberal trade relations. By doing so, a suitable 
atmosphere  for  US  model  capitalism  was  created,  the  influence  of  leftists/communists  was 
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diminished, and the positions of US corporations in the European market as well as liberal trade 
relations  between  the  Western  European  countries  were  guaranteed1 (Block,  1978,  O’Brien, 
2000: 535, Cox, 1971: 562).
Although discussions on the Marshall Plan led to splits between a number of organisations, 
such as trade unions and left wing political parties in the Western European countries, the US did 
not encounter strong oppositions to the creation process of US style capitalism (Marglin, 1990: 
6). Therefore, in the US as well as in the Western European countries, many important changes 
occurred in economic and social life in this process. The class compromise between capital and 
working class was only one of them. Accordingly, the decisions of enterprises, such as increases 
in compensation together with labour productivity, working conditions and job security would be 
taken by the managements of corporations unilaterally. However, trade unions would also make 
cooperation with the management. The compromise also relied upon the idea that the unionized 
workers  would have  advantage  in  comparison  with  non-unionized  part  of  the  working class. 
Although some working class organisations such as WFTU and its members around the world 
demanded the socialization and democratization of the ownerships of the means of production, 
within the Western side, labour movements accepted the delimiting the power of capital through 
regulations and reforms. At the same time, they accepted the legitimacy of capitalism (Wahl, 
2007; Gordon at all, 1986: 48-49). All these developments in the relations between capital and 
labour contributed to intensification of labour segmentation along job, gender, and racial lines 
(Wahl, 2007). Additionally, one of the most important components of production process (as well 
as  of  trade  union  movements)  became  bureaucratization  because  of  increasing  bureaucratic 
control  by the army of management  cadres  devoted to  supervision and discipline  production 
process (Gordon at all, 1987: 48-49).
1 The Marshall Plan had important effects in terms of international labour movement but these effects will be dealt 
within following chapter. 
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Another effect of the post Second World War era was the indisputable superiority of the US 
and its  organizations  around the  world.  During  the period,  the US economical,  political  and 
military institutions played a significant role in world political economy. They dominated foreign 
suppliers of the goods needed by the production in the US and buyers of the goods produced by 
US corporations (Gordon at all,  1987: 49). In other words, almost all the rules of game were 
determined by the US and its institutions alone.  
3.2.Restructuring Process of International Labour Movement 
After the Second World War, the international labour movement was also restructured. 
This process began with the establishment of WFTU in a conference held in London in October 
1945. In the conference, of which the CIO from US, the TUC from Britain and the Soviet labour 
organizations were participant, the WFTU was established as a single worker international. The 
assertion  of  the  WFTU  was  that  it  was  the  representative  of  67  million  workers  from  56 
countries. Therefore, in the same year, following its demand, the WFTU was recognized as a 
representative  of  world  labour  at  the  meeting  of  the  United  Nations  (Southall,  1995:  36-37, 
Thomson and Larson, 1978:13, O’Brien, 2000: 536). 
The formation of the WFTU led other labour organization of the US, the AFL, which was 
strongly anti-communist and had strong relations with US government, business community and 
the  CIA,  to  take  an  anti-WFTU  stance.  In  contrast  to  the  CIO,  in  which  communist  trade 
unionists were working since its formation after the New Deal policies in the thirties, the AFL 
and its leading managers argued that the WFTU was not a representative of world labour but an 
unusual amalgamation of British colonialism and Soviet Communism. For example, according to 
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George Meany, who was one of the most important managers of the AFL, although there were 
fifteen British dominions in the WFTU, seven of them did not have a real labour movement. 
Further, British imperialism had six million votes whilst the voting power of the Soviet Union 
was  27  million.  In  other  words,  the  most  important  communist  power  of  the  world  had  a 
significant position within the organization. Therefore, the existence of the WFTU as a labour 
international was not acceptable to AFL (Thomson and Larson, 1978:6-13). 
The  British  side  had  a  different  stance.  The  TUC,  which  supported  British  colonial 
policies by expelling communist-led/left wing unions from its ranks, had played a significant role 
in the formation of the WFTU. However, for it, the importance of the WFTU was coming from 
the idea that the imperial position of Britain in colonies might be saved through the WFTU. From 
this point of view, the TUC sought to have a hegemonic position within the WFTU. However, the 
WFTU remained as a leftist organization and brought the socialization and democratization of the 
ownerships  of the means of  production to  the agenda (Southall,  1995:  36-38;  Harrod: 1972; 
Cooper, 1996, Wahl, 2007).  
In fact, the US rivalry against the WFTU and the TUC’s policies within the organization 
were representing two important signals that the merger of labour under the WFTU umbrella 
would not able to have a long life. Three dynamics played a significant role in the undermining 
process of the WFTU. The first was the policies of the AFL against the WFTU. In 1947, many 
communist and leftist  trade unionists were forced to leave the CIO through the efforts of the 
AFL.  This was  the first  step of the AFL’s  policies  to force the  CIO to work with the AFL 
(Southall, 19995: 34-37). The other step would be the merger of two unions in 1955. At that time, 
the anticommunist stance of the combined organizations, the AFL-CIO, would also be guaranteed 
by writing to the AFL-CIO’s constitution the following sentence: 
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…to protect  the  labour  movement  from any  and all  corrupt  influences  and from the  
undermining efforts of communist agencies and all others who are opposed to the basic  
principles of our democracy and free democratic unionism  (Windmuller, 1956: 422).  
The second dynamic was the policies of other international labour organizations working 
in collaboration with the AFL to undermine the WFTU. Many labour organizations operating 
under the umbrella of International Trade Secretariats  (ITSs), which was a trade and industry 
based international labour model established in 1889, were example of this situation. The third 
was the withdrawals of the British TUC and the CIO from the WFTU. As pointed out above, the 
TUC had played a significant role in the establishment process of the WFTU. However, when 
communist  trade  unionists  gained  a  hegemonic  position  within  the  WFTU and  the  critiques 
against  Britain’s  imperial  policies  were  brought  to  the  agenda by the  communists,  the  TUC 
decided to leave the organization. This decision was realized under the Marshall Plan discussions, 
to which the WFTU took a very critical  position.  At the same period,  the CIO also left  the 
WFTU. In short, the first result of the undermining process of the WFTU was the withdrawal of 
the TUC and the CIO from the WFTU under the debates of the Marshall Plan in 1948, leaving it 
as  a  communist-led  international  labour  organization.  The  second  result  would  be  the 
establishment of a new and rival international labour organization under the leadership of the 
AFL (O’Brien, 2000: 536; Southall, 19995: 34-37; Press, 1984:89).    
After the breaking of the WFTU, in 1949, a new trade union international, the ICFTU, 
was established under the leadership of the AFL. The CIO and the TUC also became members of 
the new organization. To be sure, one of the most important aims in the establishment of the 
ICFTU was to battle against communist labour organizations around the world. In other words, 
the ICFTU  committed itself to undertake an anti communist mission.  At the same time, there 
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were different attempts of the AFL in collaboration with the US intelligence service, the CIA, as 
well as with other military institutions and business community in different countries, to support 
the formation of new and anti-communist national labour organizations. For example, during the 
Marshall Plan discussions in the late forties, the AFL financed and encouraged anticommunist 
political groups to boost non-communist trade unions in France, Germany and Italy (O’Brien, 
2000: 537, Southall, 1995: 37, Cooper, 1996, Cox, 1977: 395).
These  developments  led  to  several  unfavorable  results  for  international  and  national 
movement  labour movements.  The first was the isolation of the Eastern labour organizations 
from the Western labour organizations. The second was that after the breaking of the WFTU, a 
new division, relying heavily upon communist or non-communist ideological positions between 
labour organizations,  came up in many Western countries. In short,  trade unions in different 
countries came to duplicate global ideological, political and economic rivalries (Southall, 1995; 
Cooper, 1996,  O’Brien, 2000: 536). As for the third, because of the cold war between labour 
organizations, trade unions weakened and encountered important problems in Western countries. 
O’Brien  argues  that  there  was  a  causality  relation  between  this  phenomenon  and  following 
political factors. The first was the expulsion of communists and other radicals, who had played a 
major  role  within  the  trade  union  movement  since  the  1920s.  This  meant  the  sacrificing  of 
militant trade unionists from the ranks of labour movement. The second was the conservative 
structure of the established trade unions. This situation also strengthened the bureaucratization of 
trade unionism. The third was that trade unions in the Western countries might be charged as 
rebels  or  communists  when  they  developed  militant  strategies  to  ensure  workers’  rights. 
Therefore, they had to show their faithfulness to the ideological position and social order of the 
Western side (O’Brien, 2000: 537). 
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As mentioned above,  in the post-Second World War era,  trade union internationalism 
tended to replicate global ideological, political and economic rivalries and concerns. During the 
period,  there  were  four  different  trade  union  ideologies:  Communism/socialism,  social 
democracy,  Christianity  and  business  unionism.  Each  of  these  ideological  positions  was 
represented  by  different  international  organizations.  For  example,  as  pointed  out  above,  the 
WFTU was the representative of communist or left wing trade unionism, while the ideological 
position of the World Confederation of Labour (WCL) hinged on the Catholicism. As for the 
ICFTU, even if conservative, liberal and pro-capitalist AFL had a significant role in its formation, 
in respect to its majority, it was a representative of European social democracy (Press, 1984: 89). 
However, differences between the European trade unionism and American trade unionism within 
the ICFTU also led to some controversies. Within the ICFTU, there were two different political 
tendencies  linked to the given four ideologies.  The anti  socialists,  anti-social  democratic  and 
conservative ideological position of the AFL (later AFL-CIO) and the social democratic position 
of the European trade unions. The AFL’s trade unionism understanding relied heavily upon the 
concept  of  business  unionism or  bread-and-butter  unionism.  According  to  Harrod,  American 
unionism  could  be  described  with  following  names:  business  unionism,  philosophy  of  no-
philosophy unionism, non-political unionism, pragmatic unionism, practical unionism, pure- and-
simple unionism, and bread-and-butter unionism (Harrod, 1972). The most determinant idea for 
the US labour was that  the capitalist  mode of production is  the best  for workers.  Therefore, 
labour  organizations  might  suggest  some reform but  should never  try  to  change the system. 
Additionally, according to this model, labour organizations should be operating as interest groups 
concentrating only on economic issues and be dependent on the tripartite structure composed by 
the government, business community and worker organizations (Godfried, 1987: 52;  Spalding, 
1976: 45-46). Moving from such an ideological position, the AFL (and after the merger the AFL-
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CIO) promoted the internationalization of US capitalism. It also worked for the legitimacy of 
productionist and distributionist notions through 'bread and butter' unionism. Of course, in such a 
trade unionism understanding, the most important partners of it would be the US state and its 
organizations, such as the CIA, USAID, state departments, universities as well as multinational 
corporations (Godfried, 1987: 52). 
After the introduction of the Marshall Plan, the importance of trade unions in US foreign 
policy increased. Especially by the 1950s, under the effects of the internationalization of capital 
and  US  economical  and  political  hegemony,  the  AFL-CIO  operated  in  regions  where  US 
corporations had important investments or military relations. AFL-CIO’s policies relied heavily 
upon two basic principles. The first was to support pro-capitalism policies whilst the second was 
to  work  in  collaboration  with  anti  labour  agents,  governments,  business  community  and 
intelligent services at home and abroad (Spalding, 1976: 46, Scipes, 6-10, Southall, 1995: 45). Of 
course, this kind working style embraced by AFL-CIO affected the relations between the AFL-
CIO and other trade unions working within the ICFTU. 
The  AFL’s  policies  seeking  to  have  a  dominant  position  within  the  international  labour 
movement had a major impact upon other labour organizations working within the ICFTU. The 
basic concern for the AFL was the ICFTU’s ‘soft’ stance on ‘communism threat’. Additionally, 
according to the AFL, the TUC might try to dominate the organization and this might lead the 
ICFTU to advocate colonialism. To be sure, the continuation of colonialism would not be suitable 
for the American interests in colonial regions. Therefore, the AFL tried to undermine the TUC’s 
position within the organization. For example, at the second congress of the ICFTU in Milan in 
1951, Victor Tewson, the general secretary of TUC, was elected as the president of the ICFTU. 
After the election, the AFL boycotted the ICFTU for two years (Southall, 1995: 39). From this 
point of view, it can be argued that the most important sides of hegemony struggle within the 
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ICFTU were the AFL and the TUC, because of their determining positions in the world political 
economy. In other words, while the US as the new hegemonic power of the world was trying to 
undermine Britain’s position in colonial regions and TUC’s position in labour area, the TUC’s 
aim was to function in order to save its old hegemonic position in favor of the colonial role of 
Britain. However, the winner of this struggle was American side because of its huge financial 
possibilities  coming from anti-labour presidents, the biggest US corporations and the CIA. In 
addition, after the merger with the CIO in 1955, the AFL-CIO’s influence and weight within the 
ICFTU increased (Thomson and Larson, 1978: 5). 
3.3.Hegemony  Struggles  within  the  Western  Bloc  and  the  Beginning  of 
Overseas Labour Policies in the Post-Second War Era
Historically, many colonial powers embraced overseas labour policies in order to control 
the labour  movements  and social  order  in  their  colonies  before the  Second World War.  For 
example, the 1920s and the 1930s represented a period that Britain had an important influence 
over the Indian labour movement and in the African countries during the Second World War 
through  the  TUC  and  full-time  labour  officials  (Haworth  and  Ramsay,  1984:  81).  It  also 
encouraged the establishment of trade unions. For example, in 1930 the Secretary of State for 
Colonies, Lord Passfield, notified colonies that the development of trade unionism in the colonies 
was a desirable and legitimate characteristic of industrial and social development. At the same 
period, France also applied a similar policy in its colonies (Windmuller, 1963: 562).
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The US also used a similar method in different regions around the world. For example, in 
1918, the AFL helped the formation of Pan American Labour in Latin America (PALLA). The 
basic aim of the AFL in helping to the formation of PALLA was to show the way implemented 
by the AFL in the labour area (Windmuller, 1963: 560-563).  Between the two world wars, the 
AFL’s overseas policies relied on anti-fascism. In the next period, however, the most important 
target  in  its  international  relations  became anti-communism.  For instance,  during the Second 
World  War,  the  AFL  had  strong  relations  with  one  of  the  most  important  nationalist  and 
communist-led  trade  union  organization  of  Latin  America,  Latin  American  Confederation  of 
Labour  (CTAL), which was affiliated with the WFTU. However, after the Second World War, 
this situation changed rapidly. Some labour attaches, including Irving Brown, who operated in 
almost all continents as a cold warrior in favor of US interests in the post Second World War 
period,  were  appointed  to  the  region  to  develop  relations  with  non-communist  labour 
organizations.  As a  result  of  these  efforts,  in  1948,  the  most  important  national  trade  union 
disaffiliated from the CTAL. Subsequently,  the  Confederacion Interamericana de Trabajadores 
(CIT) was established as a rival WFTU and the pro-Peronist Argentine Labour Confederation 
(CGT),  which was described as  a 'fascist'  organization  by the AFL.  However,  the new non-
communist organization could not survive for a long time because of new developments within 
international labour. It amalgamated with the other non-communist labour organizations of the 
region  within  three  years  and  its  name  was  changed  to  the  Organizational  Regional  Inter-
Americana de  Trabajadores (the Inter American Regional Labour Organization-ORIT),  which 
became an affiliate  the ICFTU (Scipes, 2000: 9, Spalding, 1976: 50,  Bethell and Roxborough, 
1992, 27-28). 
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ORIT  was  also  a  means  of  controlling  the  Latin  American  labour  movement.  Many 
governments and intelligent services of the Western capitalist countries benefited from ORIT in 
terms of controlling labour in the continent. In particular, US government in collaboration with 
the AFL-CIO played a significant role in the internal and external policies of ORIT. For example, 
the AFL-CIO always tried to dominate the ORIT through its financial resources (Thomson and 
Larson, 1978:40-43). Further, ORIT’s stance was a reflection of AFL-CIO’s ideology and so its 
first aim was to struggle against communism by rejecting the existence of class antagonisms. 
According to the ORIT’s official policies, Latin American labour was an interest group like other 
professional  groups,  such  as  military,  church  or  landowners,  but  not  was  a  social  class. 
Additionally, it addressed reforms within the existing system, but rejected the existence of class 
oppositions (Wedin, 1984: 26; Spalding, 1976: 50).  
ORIT’s activities ranged from trade unionist education to the formation of schools for 
trade union leaders at different universities, to special trade union institutes in collaboration with 
US government agencies, such as the State Department, US embassies and to the formation of 
different  social  facilities,  such  as  libraries,  offices,  restaurants  in  different  regions.  It  also 
organized several paramilitary activities, supported dictatorships and tried to split left resistance 
movements (Spalding, 1976: 51; Thomson, and Larson, 1978:39-40). For example, it supported a 
US financed military coup against the Arbenz government in Guatemala in 1954 and the Bay of 
Pigs attack, which was organized by US backed Cubans against Castro in 1961. The coup against 
Brazilian president Joao Goulart in 1964 was also supported by the ORIT (Spalding 1976: 51) 
It also had strong relations with many national and international institutions, such as the 
USAID, the Organization of American States, the Inter American Development Bank, ITSs, the 
labour  departments  of  US  embassies,  the  International  Development  Foundation  (IDF),  the 
Council on Latin America and many private institutions (Spalding, 1976: 52). As for its financial 
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resources, although British and European trade union leadership provided an important financial 
resource for ORIT, its most important financier was the US institutions, including, the CIA and 
the AFL-CIO (Thomson and Larson, 1978:39). 
As mentioned above, ORIT played a significant role in the creation of non-communist 
labour movements and supporting anticommunist governments in Latin America. However, the 
formation and existence of ORIT as a non-communist and Western-led organization did not solve 
the problems between Americans and Europeans, especially between the AFL-CIO and the TUC. 
One of the most striking indicators of this was the discussion on the International Solidarity Fund 
(ISF) towards the end of the fifties. At the 1957 Congress of the ICFTU in Tunis, a decision was 
taken to  form an  international  trade  union  solidarity  fund,  which  would  be managed  by the 
general secretary of the organization. At the conference, a fund committee was appointed. The 
chairperson of the committee was Jacob Oldenbroek, who was from Netherlands and the General 
Secretary  of  ICFTU.  However,  the  committee  also  comprised  members  from Canada,  West 
Germany, Scandinavia, the United Kingdom and the US. The aim of the fund was to gather two 
million pounds over the next three years period. For such an aim, US contribution to the fund was 
important. However, there was a question mark about whether the US, which was intending to 
launch its own independent plans to establish a labour school in Africa, would try to dominate the 
fund’s policies. In the meeting of committee members a few months later, Vincent Tewson, who 
was the TUC’s General Secretary, was elected as chairperson of the fund. Later, the AFL- CIO 
was convinced on the idea that it would convert 50.000 dollars, which would be invested into the 
African labour centre and would also provide a grant for the ICFTU’s plan. Additionally,  the 
AFL-CIO agreed to give a million dollars to the fund (Thomson and Larson, 1978:19, Southall, 
1995: 39). However, in return for this grant the AFL-CIO demanded a more powerful position 
within the fund by using its financial power and by threatening the ICFTU with leaving the fund 
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to  run  its  own  independent  program.  In  doing  so,  the  aim  of  the  AFL-CIO  was  to  force 
Oldenbroek to resign. Therefore, after the 1959 Congress of the ICFTU, Meany pointed out that 
they could withdraw his men and money unless  Oldenbroek was taken away (Thomson and 
Larson, 1978:20-21, Southall, 1995: 41). However, since Oldenbroek had a significant support 
from the European trade unions he was able to save his position. As mentioned above, the AFL-
CIO had some serious problems with the TUC. For example,  although they worked together 
under  the  ICFTU  umbrella  for  a  long  time,  they  had  different  organizational  strategy 
understandings, especially in Latin America and Africa.  The TUC’s strategy was to build up 
grass roots organizations, while the US aimed to create national centers. However, in fact, the 
problem was much beyond the difference between organizational strategies. They were worried 
about  each  other’s  plans  and  influences  in  Latin  America  and  Africa  (Southall,  1995:  41; 
Luckhardt and Wall, 1980; Meynaud and Salah-Bey, 1963). This situation also continued after 
the retirement of Tewson. When he retired in 1960, George Meany replaced him as chairperson 
of the fund and promised that the AFL-CIO would not carry out its own independent program. 
However, this time, the TUC declined to pay money to the fund for the period between 1961 and 
1963, arguing that financial resources had been wasted (Southall, 1995: 40; Thomson and Larson, 
1978:21). Furthermore, when the ISF had first begun, the ICFTU claimed that activities should be 
financed by union funds. However, the AFL-CIO sought to have a hegemonic position within the 
fund, and in the last, it became successful. Subsequently, the AFL-CIO’s struggle for hegemony 
in labour area in Latin America and Africa was won by the US and AFL-CIO, especially by the 
sixties (Southall, 1995: 41-43;  Luckhardt and Wall, 1980; Meynaud and Salah-Bey, 1963).  
Towards the end of the fifties,  American unionists  had organized several  activities  in 
Latin America. For example, in 1959 Joseph Beirne, head of the Communications Workers of 
America (and later  one of the top officials  of AIFLD) launched a training program for Latin 
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American trade unionists. Because of the success of this initiative, he suggested to George Meany 
to organize a similar trade union program on behalf of the AFL-CIO. The following year, George 
Lodge, the Secretary of Labour, released a statement advising that bilateral organizations might 
be more effective than multilateral ones in the labour field in Latin America. Subsequently, the 
AFL-CIO  Executive  Committee  organized  an  Education  program  for  Latin  American  trade 
unions. In the frame of this project three hundred non-communist unionists would be given three 
months education in the United States (Spalding, 1976: 53-55). However, the AFL-CIO and the 
US State Department avoided organizing a fully independent program in Latin America almost 
until  the 1960s, believing that Latin  American labour movement  must be kept secure against 
communist  influence.  However,  the Cuban Revolution in  January 1960 became an important 
turning point. After the revolution, in 1961, the AFL-CIO decided to form an independent AFL-
CIO  trade  union  foundation  named  the  American  Institute  for  Free  Labour  Development 
(AIFLD). Consequently,  in 1962, the AIFLD was launched.  The creation of AIFLD meant that 
the AFL-CIO broke its promise to the ICFTU by entering its own independent route (Southall, 
1995: 42; Thomson and Larson, 1978:22, Scipes, 10; Spalding, 1976:53)
Although the AIFLD was established as a non-profit corporation, the Chairman of the 
Board of Trustees was a millionaire J.Peter Grace, who was Chief Executive of W.R Grace and 
Company,  which  was  a  multinational  with  huge  holdings  in  Latin  America  (Thomson  and 
Larson, 1978:43). Therefore, the Institute was financed by different profit organizations at the 
same time. For instance beside the AFL-CIO and the US government as non-profit institutions 
there  were  also  several  American  corporations,  including  W.R.Grace&Company,  Anaconda 
Company and Pan American World Airways as financiers (Cox, 1971: 555). Among its other 
important sponsors there were the USAID and the CIA. For instance, between 1961 and 1963, it 
received nearly one million dollar just from the CIA. Within the period between 1962 and 1967, 
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89 percent of its funds was provided by the USAID. However, the contribution of the fees from 
members was about 6 percent while the contribution of business represented by grants from over 
70 corporations was only five percent. During this period, the US government made almost 16 
million dollars contribution to AIFLD (Spalding, 1976:54). By the end of the sixties, its annual 
budget reached almost seven million dollars and by 1971, it became the fifteenth largest recipient 
of largesse from USAID with 7.593 million dollars (Wedin, 1984: 25; Spalding, 1976:54). In 
addition to its financial power, the AIFLD was a very important political institution in the US 
foreign affairs. For example, in some countries even it was able to overrule the wishes of US 
ambassadors (Thomson and Larson, 1978:43).
The AIFLD had two basic functions. The first was the training of labour leaders on a non-
communist and non-political trade unionism basis, by aiming to create free trade unions while the 
second was to support the activities of US companies in the region. Additionally, for all activities 
organized  by  the  AIFLD,  a  tripartite  structure,  which  meant  the  alliance  between  labour, 
corporations and government, was the key point (Scipes, 20009). Besides, unions trained by the 
AIFLD had to be critical against communism but should not be critical of the United States, US 
corporate  investments  and the  regional  governments  where these  unions  existed should have 
good relations with the US (Scipes, 9, Spalding, 1976:54, Wedin, 1984: 26). For the AIFLD there 
were two different type countries around the world: the totalitarian countries like the ones behind 
the  Iron Curtain and the  democratic ones like Western capitalist  countries.  As for the Latin 
American  countries,  they  were  autocratic countries,  and  not  dangerous  as  the  totalitarian 
countries were. This was because that they did not have total regulation and control over the lives 
of their citizens (Wedin, 1984: 27).
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One of the most important aims of the activities organized by the AIFLD was to create 
labour  leaders  embracing  AFL-CIO's  criteria.  Therefore,  it  organized  many  visits  for  trade 
unionists to the US in order to show the American way. Educational and social projects, regional 
and local training activities, regional or local periodic educational meetings, books, pamphlets, 
educational  and  technical  assistance  programs  from  union  to  union,  visitor  exchanges,  new 
institutions  to  strengthen  the  national  labour  bodies   were  some  examples  of  its  activities 
(Spalding:  1976:52-55,  Scipes,  2000,  9-10).  For  example,  its  main  educational  program was 
organized in Chile. Through these education programs, 5963 Chileans attended in the seminars 
organized by the AIFLD. By the end of 1972, another 2874 people were trained. At the same 
time, 108 Chileans graduated from the AIFLD course at Front Royal, Virginia (Scipes, 2000, 18). 
In  Columbia  and  Peru,  the  AIFLD  trained  almost  five  percent  of  all  union  members.  The 
candidates who became successful were additionally presented a three-month course in AIFLD’s 
training centre at Front Royal. Furthermore, these people remained on the payroll for a more nine 
months,  after  the  course  was  completed.  ‘The  Inter  America  and  International  Labour 
Movement’, ‘Adult Education, Instruction in Co-operatives’, ‘Time and Motion Study’, ‘Credit 
Unions’, ‘the Co-operative Movement: Techniques and Problems’, ‘the AIFLD Department of 
Social  Projects’,  ‘History  and  Structure  of  North  American  Labour  Movement’,  ‘Political 
Systems: Democracy and Totalitarianism’ were among the subjects of Front Royal (Thomson and 
Larson, 1978:43). 
To  sum up  the  AIFLD’  policies  played  a  significant  role  in  the  creating  process  of 
weakened,  divided,  ‘yellow’  trade  unions  (Wedin,  1984:  27).  The  AIFLD  also  played  an 
important role in inspiring other countries to create overseas labour programs in Latin America. 
In other words, after the AIFLD, many countries, such as Germany and France, tried to strength 
their positions in developing countries by using the ICFTU for trade unions or their own national 
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foundations for national political purposes. For example, in the beginning of the sixties, Germany 
launched its independent overseas labour policy operated by the Friedrich Ebert Foundation of 
the  Social  Democratic  Party,  the  Konrad  Adenauer  Foundation  of  Christian  Democrats  and 
Neumann Foundation of the Liberal Party. Activities of these organizations were financed by the 
German government, businesses and trade unions (Thomson and Larson, 1978: 28). However, 
because of its dominant position the US labour movement would have a distinguished and a more 
strong position in Latin America and, in the next period, in Africa. 
3.4.Overseas Labour Programs in Africa 
For the US, the establishment of the new hegemony in Africa was also important because 
of the strategic position and rich agricultural and mineral sources of the latter. However, national 
liberation, communist and labour movements were very important actors of the era in all over the 
world. In many countries, they were struggling against colonial  policies of the past, trying to 
establish a non-capitalist order or aiming to gain political independence. This was also fact in the 
African continent.  From the 1960s,  many African nations gained their  political  independence 
from the British and French colonial empires, and revolutionary and Marxist movements played 
important role at this process. Therefore, the US tried to establish its hegemony in Africa over 
and above that of the incumbent colonial powers. In short, the US drive to achieve hegemony in 
Africa became one of the most important phenomena of the period (Seidman and Seidman, 1978: 
9-11).
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Policies to realize this aim ranged from the investments of multinational corporations to 
the  operations  of  the  CIA.  Clandestine  political  and  paramilitary  activities  also  played  a 
significant role in the process of creating a new order in Africa. The use of businesses as an 
intelligence cover was one of the examples  of this  tendency.  Otherwise,  US objectives  were 
pursued  through  political  advisers,  subsidies  to  individuals,  financial  support  and  technical 
assistance  to  governments,  support  of  private  organizations  including  labour  unions  and 
corporations,  secret  propagandas,  exchange  of  persons,  economic  operations,  paramilitary  or 
political actions to support African regimes etc. Through these kinds of policies, the US tried to 
undermine the liberation movements on the continent according to the logic that white minority 
rule in Southern Africa would best serve American interests in terms of profits and containing 
communism (Davis, 1978:285-289; Lemarchand, 1978:345). In 1969, this policy reached a new 
level. Under the growing struggles against colonialism in Southern Africa, the US official policy 
reached  a  conclusion  through  National  Security  Study  Memorandum  39  ordered  by  Henry 
Kissinger.  Accordingly,  the  Whites  would  stay  in  Southern  Africa  and  constructive 
transformation would be realized only through whites. Additionally, blacks should not hope to 
change current political situation by using violence. The best policy was to relax the US stance 
against  the  White  regimes  and to  counterbalance  the  political  costs  of  such an  approach by 
extending support to other Southern African states (Southall, 1995: 186).
During  the  1960s,  US overseas  labour  policies  also  extended  towards  African  states. 
However,  although  the  AFL-CIO had an  important  power  in  Latin  America,  in  the  African 
continent  the  situation  was  different.  In  other  words,  in  Africa,  it  had  a  limited  influence. 
Therefore, it used the ICFTU to extend its influence within the African labour movements. The 
ICFTU was important for the AFL-CIO’s overseas programs in Africa because approximately 57 
per  cent  of  organized  workers  in  Africa  were  members  of  the  national  labour  organizations 
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affiliated to the ICFTU as of 1957 (Southall,  1995: 40). However, this did not mean that the 
AFL-CIO and the ICFTU worked in accord with each other. In contrast, the AFL-CIO tried to 
undermine the ICFTU to have more strong position for itself in the region. For example, in 1957, 
the  ICFTU  organized  an  African  Regional  Conference  in  Accra,  Ghana.  The  conference 
witnessed  conflicts  between  the  AFL-CIO and  the  ICFTU.  In  the  conference,  the  AFL-CIO 
secretary-treasurer,  William Schnitzler,  gave  a  speech criticizing  colonialism.  Because of  the 
speech, the French observer Marcel Babau criticized the ICFTU secretariat for not reviewing the 
speech  before.  He  also  charged  US  representatives  of  trying  to  organize  political  action. 
According to  Babau,  the presence of  AFL-CIO representatives  in  the  conference  was also a 
problematic because the AFL-CIO had not contributed to the ICFTU regional fund, which had 
funded the conference. British TUC was also worried about the potential impact of the US in 
general.  In  the  conference,  although  a  decision  to  establish  a  labour  school  and  an  African 
regional organization was taken, the ICFTU was not able to succeed these proposals before than 
AFL-CIO’s attempts (Yevette, 1998: 8). Some American trade unions, especially International 
Ladies’  Garment  Workers’  Union (ILGWU),  managed by Springer,  had begun to  give some 
financial support to some African unions to support strikers or other labour activists. Besides, in 
the  next  period,  in  Kenya,  the  Kenya  Federation  of  Labour’s  (KFL)  trade  union  center  and 
solidarity house were established with the AFL-CIO’s financial  supports. Some African trade 
unionists  were  also  offered  a  labour  scholarship  program to  attend  a  trade  union  education 
program at  the  Harvard  labour  Management  Industrial  Relations  Center  (Yevette,  1998:  9). 
However, the AFL-CIO continued to work under the ICFTU umbrella. 
In 1960, the ICFTU established the African Regional Organisation (AFRO) to diminish 
the effects of radical and left wing African trade unionists (Meynaud and Salah-Bey, 1963: 130; 
Southall, 1995: 41). As a response to the formation of the AFRO, in May 1961, in Casablanca, 
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radical  and leftist  trade  unionist  from different  African  countries  established  the  All  African 
Trade Union Federation (AATUF) which was supported by the WFTU. Their main argument was 
that African trade unionism should be based neither on the Eastern trade unionism nor on the 
Western trade unionism. They also highlighted the importance of working class unity and the 
independence  of  trade  unions,  rejection  of  external  interference,  internationalist  policies  and 
solidarity  with  working  class  around  the  world,  workers  participation  in  the  regulation  and 
management of development programmes (Meynaud and Salah-Bey, 1963: 132; Southall, 1995: 
41).  After  the  establishment  of  the  AATUC,  the  AFRO  and  other  non-AATUF  labour 
organizations established the African Trade Union Confederation (ATUC) which permitted to its 
member organizations to become affiliate in other labour internationals (Southall, 1995:42). 
In fact, in the African continent, the AFL-CIO’s basic target was to weaken the TUC’s 
position. Therefore, it  attacked colonialism and attempted to set up and finance national trade 
union centers from a top down approach. However, the TUC seemed doubtful about the AFL-
CIO’s  political  connections  (Southall,  1995:  41).  For  example,  according  to  Tewson,  who 
objected the Americans by arguing that they were equating the TUC with  British colonialism in 
Africa, the TUC would not abandon Africa because of five reasons. First, they believed in trade 
unionism.  Second,  in  their  view  trade  unions  could  cut  across  racial,  ethnic  and  religious 
diversities. Third, the managing of routine trade union problems was vital for African workers 
and it was an important training opportunity for handling the wider national difficulties. Fourth, 
trade union organization could make important contributions to economic stability of the region 
and  this  was  important  for  the  newly  independent  countries  in  the  region.  Fifth,  free  and 
democratic trade union would guarantee democratic systems (Thomson, and Larson, 1978:51). 
However,  especially  after  the  beginning  of  the sixties,  ICFTU’s and TUC’s  influence  in  the 
African continent declined (Meynaud and Salah-Bey, 1963: 92). 
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. In 1964, the African American Labour Center (AALC) supervised by Irving Brown from 
New York, was formed by the AFL-CIO. The formation of the AALC followed the increase of 
US investments in Southern Africa. This meant that conflicts between the ICFTU and the AFL-
CIO reached a different stage. As a result of new stage, in the next period, for example, the AFL-
CIO  left  the  ICFTU  (Southall,  1995:  43).  As  mentioned  above,  the  US  had  developed  an 
anticommunist policy framework for the African continent. However, after the foundation of the 
AALC these policies became more obvious (Trewhela, 191: 74). Its function was not to activate 
African workers against the policies of minority regimes in Africa but was to have an effect on 
African struggle to ensure the status quo by vaccinating the working class movement against 
radical powers (Seidman and Seidman, 119). This aim had two different dimensions: Economic 
and social. In the economic dimension, the aim was to create a working class movement, which 
would not oppose to the investments made by the US corporations in the continent. As for the 
political  dimension,  what was desired was a labour movement,  which would be used against 
governments when it was necessary like in the Latin American countries (Trewhela, 191: 74). 
The AALC had important relations with the US government, other organizations managed 
by  the  US government,  US business  community  and the  CIA.  For  example,  its  budget  was 
provided by the US state through the USAID (Trewhela, 2001: 77). Almost four fifth of dollars 
were given by the US government whilst the contribution of US labour movement less than 20 
per cent.  However,  in fact,  the CIA, which spent more than 100 million dollars  for overseas 
labour policies in different countries in the sixties, worked with the AALC by using the USAID 
as a means of covering its operations (Seidman and Seidman, 1978: 121). 
The AALC managed and financed over 100 projects in different countries between 1965 
and 1971. The number of project financed by the AALC reached almost 200 until 1974. These 
projects were implemented in 34 countries (Seidman and Seidman, 1978: 120; Godfried, 1987: 
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55). Vocational training activities, cooperatives and credit unions, social services, information 
and communications,  study tours  and visitors  programmes,  workers  education  and leadership 
training  programs,  material  assistance,  literature  and  equipment,  the  establishment  of  labour 
colleges  were some examples  of  its  activities  (Thomson,  and Larson,  1978:57;  Seidman and 
Seidman,  120-  121).  For  example,  the  AALC and Nigeria's  United  Labour  Congress  jointly 
established a Trade Union Institute for Economic and Social Development, which was directed 
by American trade unionists proposed by the AALC, in 1966. In 1971, a trade union education 
programme was given start in Botswana and the salaries of the staffs of the center were paid by 
the AALC. In the same period, in Ghana, the AALC assisted to the Ghana Trade Union Congress 
to set up the Ghana Labour College. Many headquarters for national centers were established in 
Ethiopia.  American trade union literature  was also handed out to many African organisations 
(Godfried, 55; Thomson, and Larson, 1978:57). Additionally, many African trade unionists went 
to  the  US to attend  activities  in  American  universities,  especially  in  the  Harvard  University 
(Godfried, 1987: 55). These programs played a significant role in creation of a labour aristocracy. 
The AALC also attacked the All African Trade Union Federation (AATUF), which had strong 
relations  with the WFTU and accepted a  revolutionary stance (Seidman and Seidman,  1978: 
121).  As  a  conclusion,  all  AALC  policies  led  to  decline  of  ICFTU’s  influence  in  African 
continent (Thomson, and Larson, 1978:57).
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Chapter IV
The Post Second World War Period in South Africa 
4.1.Apartheid, Law and Suppression of Black Working Class
Undoubtedly,  after  the Second World War,  the most  important  phenomenon in  South 
Africa was the arrival of apartheid administration. Following the arrival of the National Party 
(NP) in power in 1948, the majority of South Africans were faced with important suppressions of 
rights by the government. Under the apartheid, the NP and its allies tried to crash all opposition 
movements by restricting political  activities, excluding blacks from the parliamentary system, 
imposing  police  state  applications  and  enacting  many  acts,  which  all  intensified  racial 
discrimination (Pampallis, 1995: 207; Southall, 1995:19).  
One of the first major instruments introduced by the NP government was the Suppression 
of Communism Act of 1950. Under the Act, the Communist Party of South Africa (CPSA) was 
outlawed and many members of the party, who were also members of trade unions, were arrested 
and/or banned from being involved in political and trade union activities. Although the African 
National Congress (ANC) was not outlawed, it was also among the targets of the legislation. Act 
also banned African trade unions from being recognized by the government  (Southall,  1995; 
Pampallis, 1995: 207, Baskin, 1991; Finnemore and Merwe, 1996: 29; Seidman and Seidman, 
1978:  33).  The  act  defined  communism  so  broadly  that  it  gave  the  government  virtually 
indiscriminate power to arrest people, whether communist or non-communist. For example, the 
Minister  of  Justice  had such wide authority  that  he/she could restrict  or ban people only by 
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arguing that they engaged in  communist activities. A banned person by the ministry could not 
speak in public and come together with other banned people, but they could also be forced to live 
in a certain region or prevented from attending activities. Under the Suppression of Communism 
Act, many African trade unionists, political activists,  leaders and progressive people, white or 
black, were harassed, jailed, banned, tortured and even killed (Pampallis,  1995: 207; Seidman 
and Seidman, 1978: 32-3).
The  racial  categorization  of  people  was  one  of  the  most  important  policies  of  the 
apartheid  government.  Therefore,  in  1950,  the  apartheid  government  enacted  two  acts,  ‘the 
Population Registration Act’ and ‘the Group Areas Act’, in order to classify the population of the 
country by different race groups. According to the Population Registration Act, people living in 
South Africa were divided into four racial groups:  ‘Native (later named as ‘Bantu’), European’ 
(later named as ‘White’), coloured and Indian (later named as ‘Asian’). The Group Areas Act 
obliged different racial groups to live in different urban areas. Therefore, after the act, hundreds 
of  thousands  of  black  people  were  removed  from  their  homes  and  businesses  to  different 
townships (Pampallis, 1995: 208).
In 1951, the Bantu Authorities Act, another important law to strengthen apartheid, came 
into  practice.  This  act  abolished  the  Native  Representative  Council  and  provided  for  the 
formation of ‘Bantu Authorities’ headed by chiefs with limited administration power who were 
appointed by government. The apartheid government gave extensive administrative power to the 
traditional chiefs and, by doing so, constituted indirect rule (SADET, 2004: 150; Pampallis, 1995: 
207).  However,  the hierarchical  structure,  such  as  regional,  territorial,  executive  and judicial 
powers constituted by the act, was still controlled by whites (Butler at all, 1977: 20). Moving 
from this point, it can be argued that, the basic aim of the act was to control the black population 
of the country by giving them some limited rights.  
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The Native Act enacted in 1952 relied on the decision that the passes that Africans had to 
carry since the 1920s would be combined into a single passbook. These single passbooks would 
be issued over a few years by the government and had to show owner’s information, such as 
name, address, photograph, identity number, ethnic grouping, authorization to be in a specific 
area, tax slip and the monthly signature of employer. The act also forced women to carry passes 
for the first time since 1920. According to the act, the passbooks had to be presented to police 
officer when demanded. People, who do not or cannot exhibit their passbooks to police officer, 
would be imprisoned or fined (Pampallis, 1995: 209). 
The Black Labour  Relations  Act of 1953 and the Industrial  Conciliation Act of 1956 
ensured  the  exclusion  of  black  workers  from  the  formal  industrial  relations  system  by 
establishing a  repressive labour  regime.  According to the Black Labour  Relations  Act,  black 
workers were not defined as employees. Therefore, African trade unions could not be recognized 
as  legal  organizations  (Webster,  1995:  268;  Ncube,  1985:  88;  Waddington,  1999:  138).  The 
Industrial  Conciliation  Act  went  one  more  step  by  bringing  the  job  reservation  system and 
banning the establishment of racially mixed trade unions. By this act, certain races could work 
only in certain jobs (Finnemore and Merwe, 1996: 29; Webster, 1995: 268; Ncube, 1985: 88; 
Coupe, 1995: 455; Friedman, 1987: 28). The aim of such a rule was to protect white workers 
from the competition of cheaper black workers and to divide the union movement as well as 
working class (Finnemore and Merwe, 1996: 29). For example, according to the act, coloured 
people could be members of registered trade unions, but could not have administrative jobs over 
whites. Additionally, they were subject to segregation into separate branches. The act forced the 
unions to be divided into racially exclusive branches. As a result, unions desiring to be racially 
mixed could only have white members on their administrative committees (Crankshaw, 1990: 7). 
Another feature of the act was that African trade unions, which could not be registered according 
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to the act, did not any right to negotiate with employers. The only institution, with which African 
trade unions could negotiate, was the Work and Liaison Committees, which was dominated by 
employers.  The  act  also  compelled  employers  to  pay  higher  wages  to  white  employees 
(Pampallis, 1995: 210; Lulat, 2008: 66). 
Under  such  political  conditions,  important  changes,  which  consolidated  capitalist 
accumulation process, occurred in South Africa. During the apartheid period, South Africa saw 
significant  capital  inflow;  the  profits  of  the  South  African  capitalists  as  well  as  of  foreign 
investors,  especially  from  Britain,  increased  considerably;  white  capitalist  classes  gained 
important  opportunities  to  accumulate  further  capital  (Innes,  1995:  211-224;  Southall,  1995; 
Pampallis,  1995:211).  Capitalist  farmers,  who  were  guaranteed  favorable  prices  for  their 
products; white small entrepreneurs, who benefited from lower wages and from the removal of 
Indian traders from certain places; and white workers, who benefited from job reservations, were 
other beneficiaries of apartheid policies. Additionally, the apartheid government provided many 
advantageous  government  contracts  to  Afrikaner  businesses.  The  savings  and  money  of 
government departments, local administrations as well as of state companies were deposited in 
Afrikaner banks. The government massively extended the influence of the Afrikaner business 
community,  appointing  them into  important  official  economic  boards.  Therefore,  during  the 
period, many Afrikaner businesses, such as, Sanlam, Rembrandt,  Volkskas, gained influential 
positions in the South African economy. However, English-speaking capitalists also had power 
(Pampallis, 1995: 212). 
Regarding development of the capitalist relations in the country in post war period, one of 
the most important sectors of South Africa was agriculture soon after the Second World War 
thanks to the investments made by Afrikaner capitalist class during the war (Davies at all, 1976: 
25). State subsidies, such as suitable credit conditions,  research support, agricultural extension 
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services,  irrigation,  tariff  protection,  marketing  opportunities  and  price  controls  played  a 
significant  role in the developing of agriculture  (Lulat,  2008: 68-70). As a result,  agriculture 
dominated by white South African agricultural  capitalists  became one of the most  developed 
agricultural sectors around the world (Lulat, 2008: 69).
State owned enterprises as well as state subsidies also played an important role for the 
South African economy during apartheid era. First of all, the state’s role was very important in 
infrastructural  investments,  which  were  vital  for  capital  accumulation  process  as  well  as  for 
industry (Lulat, 2008: 70). However, the role played by state owned enterprises were not limited 
only with these kinds of investments. In contrast, state investments spread to different areas of 
economy, ranging from defense to industry. For example, in 1951, in addition to the existing state 
enterprises established in the 1920s, such as The Electricity Supply Commission (ESCOM), the 
Iron and Steel Corporation (ISCOR), the Industrial Development Corporation (IDC), two new 
state  enterprises  were  established:  the  South  Africa  Coal,  Oil,  and  Gas  Corporation  and the 
Phosphate Development  Corporation.  In the next period, many new state enterprises,  such as 
South  African  Airways,  National  Finance  Corporation,  Klipfontein  Organic  Products 
Corporation, South African Industrial Cellulose Corporation, and Defense Ordnance Workshops, 
were established and all of them played a significant role in the creation of the physical capital of 
the country (Lulat, 2008: 67-70). 
Another critical sector was mining, which was one of the most important contributors to 
the GDP growth of the country. During the apartheid era, three new gold areas were launched. As 
parallel to mining sector, metal production in the country also developed. The expansion of these 
sectors  accelerated  mechanization  and  led  to  the  concentration  and  centralization  of  capital 
(Innes, 1995: 224; Lulat, 2008:70).
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South African industry also attracted a considerable amount of foreign direct investment 
in early apartheid period,. For example,  it  was in this period that one third of total industrial 
capital  was  provided  by  foreign  investors.  Foreign  investments  also  concentrated  in  mining 
sector,  especially  in  gold  mining,  and  engineering  sector.  This  played  a  crucial  role  in  the 
transformation of the national character of manufacturing sector. However, it is not to say that all 
the  South African  economy was  dominated  by foreign  investors.  In  contrast,  local  capitalist 
classes as well as foreign investors were important agents of the capitalist development process 
of the country (Davies at all, 1976:5-6, 25).
The  apartheid  system had  two  main  characteristics.  The  first  was  the  job  and living 
segregation while the latter was the formation of the Bantustans and migrant labour system. The 
main aim of the Bantustan system was to continue the reserve army of labour working for low 
wages in the borders and white areas. For example, under the implementation of the system,  a 
significant  amount  of  unemployed  population  was  clustered  in  Bantustans.  In  the  Bantustan 
system, blacks had to migrate to white areas to work in factories, mines or on farms. However, 
they had to leave their families in the  homelands. For that reason, in 1970, 6.9 people million 
stayed in the Bantustans whilst eight million blacks were compelled to leave to look for work in 
white areas. Another function of the Bantustans was to protect the white population by removing 
unemployed Africans from the vulnerable cities (Seidman and Seidman, 1978: 25-32).  In other 
words,  the  system  functioned  as  a  social  control  mechanism  through  the  Bantustan 
administrations  and  ensured  contracted  labour  needed  by  employers  through  labour  bureaus 
(Legassick and Wolpe, 1976:95). In addition, blacks were not allowed to work in ‘white collar’ 
jobs (Seidman and Seidman, 1978: 23).
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There were important differences between the working conditions of white workers and 
black workers. Firstly, as mentioned above, racial discrimination was a determining feature of 
labour market of the country in favor of white workers, of which positions can be described as 
labour aristocracy (Lulat, 2008:70). For example, in many sectors, especially in mining sector, a 
few well-paid and extremely skilled white workers were employed in technology intensive areas 
as supervisors or managers whilst many unskilled politically as well as organizationally repressed 
black workers were employed as unskilled labour power (Lulat, 68: 2008;  Davies, 1979: 182). 
All these policies  helped to reduce labour costs and constituted important differences between 
white  and black workers  in  terms of wages,  working and living  conditions.  For example,  in 
building construction sector,  whites  were earning R282 monthly while  African workers were 
earning R45. In wholesale trade, whites were earning R245 while Africans were earning R48 
(Mackler, 1972: 37). This, of course, affected income distribution between whites and blacks. In 
1969, for example, the average monthly per capita income among Africans, who constituted 69 
percent  of the population,  was  US 9.80 dollars,  while  the average  per  capita  income among 
whites,  who constituted  less  than  19 percent  of  the population,  was  133.00 dollars.  In  other 
words, whites’ living conditions were thirteen times better than blacks’ and almost equal with 
many Western industrialized nations’ citizens (Lulat, 2008: 68; Mackler, 1972: 35). Additionally, 
Africans  had  to  pay  tuition  in  schools,  whilst  education  was  free  for  whites  (Seidman  and 
Seidman, 1978: 23).
As  mentioned  above,  during  the  period,  numerous  black  workers  migrated  to  South 
Africa. For example, about four fifths of the miners were brought from neighboring countries and 
they  were  forced  to  live  in  crowded dormitories,  sleeping  on  concrete  bunks  (Seidman  and 
Seidman, 1978:88). However, South Africa’s white workers, in addition to their higher wages 
and  proper  positions  they  had  in  work  place,  enjoyed  the  lowest  unemployment  rates  in 
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comparison  with  the  workers  of  developed  countries  because  of  the  apartheid  government’s 
policies providing important job opportunities for white population (Lulat, 2008: 66-68). 
4.2.Developments within the Labour Movement of South Africa 
4.2.1. The Trade Union Council of South Africa (TUCSA): An 
organization to control the black working class   
Since the 1930s, South African labour movement had organized itself under the South 
African  Trades  and  Labour  Council  (TLC),  which  had  a  non-racial  posture,  affiliated  with 
African  trade  unions  and  claimed  legal  rights  of  African  trade  unionists.  However,  the 
organization of trade unions under the TLC was a delicate unity (Lewis, 1984: 1). 
In 1947, six pro-nationalist trade unions split from the TLC because of its admission the 
African  unions.  In  1948,  the  TLC  suggested  the  coming  together  of  African  unions  in  a 
consolidating body under its own leadership. However, in the next period, especially in 1949 and 
1950, nationalist  and pro-apartheid stance strengthened within the TLC and it decided on the 
exclusion of African trade unions from its ranks by arguing the formation of parallel  African 
organizations (Southall, 1995: 52). At the time, the NP government also tried to affect the TLC’s 
policy-making process by using the Supression of Communism Act to defuse the TLC’s left wing 
(Southall, 1995: 52). In its 1954 conference, the TLC called for the reunification of the registered 
trade unions by establishing a Unity Committee including the leading members of the TLC, the 
SAFTU, the Western Province Federation of Labour Unions, and the AEU. However, the African 
unions were excluded from the process. In the same year, the South African Trade Union Council 
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(SATUC, after  1962 TUCSA) was established and the majority of the TLC took place in its 
formation (Baskin, 1991: 13; Lewis, 1984: 157). 
The TUCSA described its stance as “promoting and advancing the economic, social and 
cultural well-being and rights of all South African workers through responsible and recognized 
collective  bargaining  and  free  negotiation”  (Godfried,  1987:  57).  According  to  the  leading 
members of the TUCSA, the union was one of the few examples of the organizations mirroring 
real and triumphant collaboration between different ethnic groups because it had been created by 
workers  coming  from  different  races  and  from  economic  conditions  (Imrie,  1979:  1-2).  In 
addition, its main focal point were the bread and butter or economic matters, including wages, 
prices, working conditions, inflation and taxation issue, pensions, housing, transport. As for its 
ideological position, the TUCSA had held a political stance on right of centre (Imrie, 1979: 50-
54).  
However, in fact, the reality was very different, especially in terms of its anti apartheid 
stance. First of all, although the TUCSA, which assumed the role of the primary representative of 
industry based unions, admitted coloured and Indian workers in mixed trade unions, it excluded 
the  African  workers  from  its  ranks  and  accepted  only  registered  trade  unions  as  members 
(Finnemore and Merwe, 1996:30; Luckhardt and Wall, 1980). Besides, although it claimed that it 
had  an  aversion  to  the  explicitness,  ideological  implications  and  firmness  of  the  apartheid 
government, and although it was against racial separation in words,  it followed a hesitant and 
vague policy by reacting very weakly against  apartheid as well  as against  job reservation.  In 
addition, it never supported an amalgamation policy with black workers (Lipton, 1986: 194-195; 
Baskin,  1991:  160).  On  top  of  all  this,  it  even  tried  to  form  some  relations  with  pro-NP 
government unions (Alexander, 2000: 125). Therefore, as Southall points out, apartheid and its 
racialist policies were conveyed into labour movement by TUCSA (Southall, 1995: 52). 
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There were different reasons for such policies of TUCSA. Firstly,  the most important 
priority of TUCSA was to protect  its member’s interests  no matter  what. The second was its 
ideological position, which was strictly opposed to ‘political unionism’ as well as to left wing 
ideology of antiapartheid movements. As mentioned above, white workers of South Africa had 
gained important benefits from the industrialization process of the post Second World War era. 
Especially, African migration and the job bar had provided them a monopoly of skilled jobs and 
preferential employment in other jobs (Lipton, 1986: 184;  Rogers, 1976: 61). Therefore, white 
workers supported the continuation of the industrial colour bar as well as apartheid in general 
(Coupe:  1995,  451;  Rogers,  1976:  61;  Lipton,  1986:  184). This  situation  affected  TUCSA’s 
stance  against  the  apartheid  policies  because,  as  underlined  above,  its  main  concern  was  to 
protect its members from the competition of unorganized and cheaper African labour (Clercq, 
1979: 72-74). For example, one of the leading members of the TUCSA had pointed out that they 
had to put the interest of its members first (Rogers, 1976: 61). Further, as Rogers points, the 
TUCSA was dealing with the South Africa’s political structure as an “off the cuff hand out for 
white  workers”  (Rogers,  1976:  61).  Therefore,  they  did  not  have  any  objection  to  racial 
separation policies of the apartheid regime (Lipton, 194-195). 
During the sixties,  in  the South African economy,  the labour  process  and division of 
labour were re-organized with the introduction of new machinery and equipments. For example, 
between 1964 and 1968 capital-intensive investments in the metal sector increased 141 percent, 
despite the fact that increase of wages was 52 percent and the increase of employment was 18 
percent (Webster, 1985: 115). This process also led to the undercutting process of white workers 
by cheaper  and less skilled African labour.  Additionally,  during the period,  one of  the most 
important problem of the South African economy was the shortage of skilled and semi skilled 
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labour power. The solution found by capitalist class of the country was to reduce dependence on 
white  labour.  However,  there  were  some  differences  between  the  positions  of  skilled  or 
semiskilled white workers. Skilled workers enjoyed with higher wages because of the shortage of 
skilled labour, whilst semi-skilled white workers began to lose their positions since they did not 
have  the  power  to  negotiate  with  employers.  Therefore,  they  had  to  compete  with  African 
workers working for lower wages in semi-skilled jobs. In addition, even if during the 1950s, de 
facto employment of the African workers on numerous positions of skilled jobs had been started, 
this was still illegal (Crankshaw, 1990: 12). This provided advantageous to skilled workers, but 
many corporations, especially operating in building sector were outsourcing in order to break out 
of the controls on the employment of semi-skilled African workers (Crankshaw, 1990: 12). In 
other words, the capitalist class of the country had been successful in reducing its labour costs by 
replacing white workers with Africans. 
After the capitalist classes started to be successful in breaking the power of white worker 
organisations by employing black workers in semi-skilled and unskilled workers,  skilled white 
workers' organisations demanded to organize the African workers in order to protect their own 
interests.  For  example,  at  the  time,  TUCSA  affiliates,  in  which  skilled  white  and  coloured 
workers were organized, lobbied within the council in order to organize African workers as well 
(Crankshaw, 1990: 15). However, although they supported the organization of the Africans under 
the TUCSA umbrella, they never supported the political struggles of Africans. In contrast, they 
supported  the  preservation  of  whites  under  apartheid  administration  (Ensor,  1988:  216). 
Nevertheless, the situation was very different for semi skilled white unions, which did not have a 
chance to  avert  undercutting  by African and coloured workers.  Therefore,  their  strategy was 
dependent on state power (Crankshaw, 1987: 11-12; Crankshaw, 1990: 12). In other words, they 
supported the exclusion of blacks from TUCSA.   
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The TUCSA discussed the issue for a long time and decided to organize  the African 
unions in  1962 by establishing  an African  Affairs  section to  organize  the blacks  in  separate 
(parallel)  unions  in  1962.  At  the  same  period,  it  also  began  to  criticize  the  policy  of  job 
reservation. In 1963, many African trade unions affiliated with FOFATUSA, which was a non-
political  African  trade  union,  joined  its  ranks  (Crankshaw,  1987:  20;  Webster,  1985:  114; 
Crankshaw, 1990: 10-15; Du Toit, 1981: 230). However, the aim of this policy of TUCSA was to 
protect its members rather than solidarity with the blacks. In fact, such a hypocritical policy was 
usual for TUCSA, because it had taken into account black workers only if such a policy would 
provide  advantage  its  white  members  (Godfried,  1987:  57).  In  addition,  despite  it  tried  to 
organize  Africans  after  the  decision  taken  in  1962,  it  had  always  subordinated  them to  the 
registered unions through parallel  unions and liaison committees2 (Clerq, 1979: 72-74; Ensor, 
1988: 221).  For instance, its first African  parallel union was the African Sheet Metal Workers 
Union. It had established a parallel union in this sector because in this sector, the intensity of 
black labour employed illegally was very high (Webster, 1985: 114). 
TUCSA’s decision to organize the blacks led to a clash with the state and pro-apartheid 
trade  unions  affiliated  with  the  TUCSA.  Some TUCSA affiliates,  such as  the  Amalgamated 
Engineering  Union  (AEU),  the  Motor  Industry  Employees’  Union  (MIEUSA),  the  Iron 
Moulders’ Society of South Africa (IMS) and Transvaal Leather and Allied Trades Industrial 
Union (TL&ATIU) criticized the admission of Africans (Webster, 1985: 114; Crankshaw, 1987: 
25). Some of them, such as AEU and MIEUSA even withdrew from its ranks (Crankshaw, 1987: 
2 According to the act, which institutionalized the liaison committees, the African workers would be prevented from 
being the members of trade unions but would be represented in liaison committees, which comprised employers and 
employees. However, white trade unions organized in the same industry would also negotiate with employers for the 
African workers. This situation was called ‘parallelism’ in South Africa (for details, see MacShane at all, 1984: 31; 
Du Toit, 1981: 330)  
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25-26). In 1966, South African Electrical Workers’ Association (SAEWA) and South African 
Typographical  Union  (SATU)  also  started  to  insist  upon  the  exclusion  of  African  unions 
(Crankshaw, 1987: 26).  The apartheid  government  also opposed the policy of organizing the 
Africans. For example, in 1967, M.Viljoen, the Minister of Labour, pointed out that: 
It is evidently TUCSA’s policy to organize so many Africans that the Government will be forced to  
recognize them. …The Government will not tolerate this undermining of our national policy. If  
TUCSA wants to undermine Government policy and create new problems then it must take note  
that the Government will  not hesitate to take the necessary measures (quoted by Crankshaw,  
1987: 20). 
TUCSA never  resisted the government’s  pressures and it  excluded the black unions from its 
ranks again in 1967 (Finnemore and Merwe, 1996: 30; Crankshaw, 1987: 19). 
Although the TUCSA encountered with reactions from the apartheid government as well 
as from some member unions, it is not possible to argue that the reason for its hesitant stance 
against  the apartheid  just  derived from the reactions  of its  member unions and the apartheid 
government.  In  contrast,  its  ideological  position,  which  relied  upon the  idea  of  non-political 
unionism and anti-communism, played a crucial role in this situation. This can be understood 
from its relations with anti-apartheid and left wing organizations. First of all, TUCSA had chosen 
to  be  in  opposition  to  the  SACTU3 which  was  a  leftist  and  racially  mixed  trade  union 
organization, and to the ANC which was leading anti apartheid organization in the country, rather 
than the apartheid regime. There were two reasons for the  enmity of the TUCSA against the 
SACTU. The first was the approach of the workers belonging to TUCSA. As mentioned above, 
many unions affiliated to the TUCSA had chosen to keep their relatively privileged positions 
under the apartheid regime. In addition, the majority of its members were conservative (Lipton, 
3 SACTU will be dealt with in the next subchapter in a more detailed framework.
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1989: 194-195). The second reason was TUCSA’s right-wing political stance, the opposition to 
the political unionism of the SACTU and disturbance from its growing influence between the 
African workers (Baskin, 1991: 160; Luckhardt and Brenda Wall, 1980). Therefore, the TUCSA 
never collaborated with SACTU but always tried to undermine it. For instance, although some 
individual member unions of the SACTU and SACTU itself applied for assistance or cooperation 
in different matters to the TUCSA because of its influence, the TUCSA never assisted SACTU 
(Ensor, 1988:223-225). 
TUCSA also left the SACTU alone in the campaigns organized by international labour 
organizations against the South African regime. For instance, the Workers’ Group of the ILO 
accepted a resolution against South Africa by describing its labour system as a modern slavery 
system and by condemning the apartheid regime as well as foreign corporations in the country. In 
1963, the South Africa was also expelled from the ILO thanks to the efforts  of the SACTU 
members. After this development, J.A. Grobbelaar who was the general secretary of the TUCSA, 
criticized this decision. According to Grobbelaar, foreign trade unions were representing a basic 
threat to South Africa because of their policies, such as boycotts for South African ships and 
aircrafts and the other actions against South Africa. According to Grobbelaar all these policies 
would be foolish (Rogers, 1976: 254). 
As for the international relations of the union, the TUCSA had also good relations with 
the  British  TUC,  the  German  labour  movement,  the  Deustscher  Gewerkschaftsbund 
Bundesvorstand (DGB) and the AFL-CIO, in addition to its indirect connections with different 
powerful international trade union groups. Therefore, many leaders and officials had attended the 
TUCSA meetings and many officials of TUCSA had attended overseas trade union conferences 
(Imrie, 1979: 44). Moreover, according to its leading members, the main purpose of TUCSA was 
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to become the largest, the best and the most effective trade union body in South Africa and the 
most important patterns of such aims were the AFL-CIO and the TUC (Imrie, 1979: 98). 
In the 1970s, TUCSA changed its exclusive policy and readmitted African trade unions 
again. This decision of the TUCSA was a result of Durban strike waves at the beginning of the 
1970s (Baskin, 1991: 17). The action wave started with bus drivers’ strike in Johannesburg in 
1972. During this strike 300 people were arrested. However, their service was very critical in 
terms of daily transport of 120 thousands African workers. Therefore, at the end of the strike they 
were able to win a wage increase of 35 percent. The strikes spread to other industries soon and 
especially, in Durban, they became very influential. By the end of 1973, the numbers of strikers 
in Durban reach about 100.000. Additionally, the strikers also gained the support of many groups 
ranging from white students to intellectuals (Macshane at all,  1984:21-23). Although TUCSA 
changed its exclusive policy in the 1970s, it was still not an ideal organization for black workers. 
This was because that the African workers would be organized in parallel unions, which was 
dependent on the decisions of parent unions in terms of finance management (Macshane at all, 
1984:36). However, in the new process, the TUCSA could not satisfy its members in terms of its 
organizational route and especially by the beginning of the 1980s, the number of its members 
considerably declined. As a result of this decline, it decided to disband in 1986 (Webster, 1995: 
27). 
4.2.2. South African Congress of Trade Unions (SACTU): An example of 
political unionism during the early apartheid era 
The black working class issued a robust response to discriminatory labour policies. This 
was the establishment of their own trade union centre in the form of fourteen registered unions 
which left from TUCSA, uniting with the Council of Non-European Trade Unions (CNETU) in 
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order to establish the South African Congress of Trade Unions (SACTU) in 1955 (Friedman, 
1987:27). SACTU, as a first formal alliance between African unions and other races, played an 
important  role  during  the  period  with  its  political  unionism perception  (Friedman,  1987:27; 
Webster, 1995: 268). Almost 31 trade unions representing a little bit more than 37.000 members 
in nine industries attended the first congress of the SACTU. Eight of them constituted four-fifths 
of the membership of the SACTU with their 29.326 members. The number of their individual 
memberships  was between 2000 and 9000. The other  trade unions joining the SACTU were 
relatively small trade unions (Lambert, 1988: 118). 
According to SACTU, working class’ struggles should move forward alongside political 
struggles.  In  addition,  trade  unions  were an  essential  element  of  decolonization  and national 
liberation struggles.  From this  point of view, it  made contact  with left  wing and progressive 
social movements in South Africa as well as internationally. In South Africa, SACTU established 
critical relations with the African National Congress (ANC) and the South African Communist 
Party (SACP), which was re-established as an underground organization in 1953. The SACP had 
so vital a role within the SACTU that many leaders of it were leading members of the SACP. 
After the formation of SACTU, its many organizers also joined the SACP. In addition, many 
SACTU members suffered under the Suppression of Communism Act (Lambert,  1988: 53-54; 
Friedman, 1987:27; Luckhardt and Wall: 1980: 372; Finnemore and Merwe, 1996: 32)
In 1953, one of the most important discussions of the anti-apartheid fighters was to launch 
a campaign which would sustain the anti apartheid struggles that had been started before. As a 
result of the discussions a decision to release a manifesto was taken. The ANC also gave support 
to  the  idea  at  its  national  conference  in  1953.  The  outcome  of  this  process  became  the 
establishment of the National Action Council (NAC), to which eight members from all individual 
organizations  would  join.  The  member  organizations  of  the  council  were  the  ANC,  Indian 
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Congress,  the  Coloured  People’s  Congress  (CPC),  and  the  Congress  of  Democrats  (COD) 
(Lambert,  1988: 130-131). These organizations also constituted the Congress of the People in 
1955  and  accepted  the  Freedom Charter.  Although  it  was  a  nationalist  text  including  some 
transitional socialist demands, for the SACTU leadership, the Freedom Charter was a means of 
reaching socialism through national liberation struggle (Lambert, 1988: 144-149). Therefore, in 
its first congress, the leadership of the SACTU took a decision to become a part of the alliance 
(Lambert, 1988: 130-131). According to the leadership of the SACTU, such a decision was to 
take the struggle beyond the bread and butter unionism by establishing relations between trade 
union struggle and political struggle (Lambert, 1988:130-131). In many regions, but specifically 
in  Natal,  many SACTU organizers  worked on the  regional  councils  of  the  NAC.  They also 
organized daily factory visits to increase the popularity of the Freedom Charter (Lambert, 1998: 
134). 
SACTU also took a stance against the policies of the hegemonic powers of the world 
capitalism. For example, it condemned the interventions of imperialist powers in Egypt, opposed 
the closure of the Soviet Consulate in South Africa as well as of atomic tests in the Sahara by 
western powers, especially by France and it also supported the nationalization of the Suez Canal 
in 1956. SACTU activists also paid favourable attention to the Chinese Revolution, the Vietnam 
War and supported the Cuban Revolution. For instance, it defended the independence of South 
Vietnam  by  condemning  US  policies.  Moreover,  almost  for  all  of  these  international 
developments, SACTU directly reacted against the United States. For example, it directly sent a 
letter to US president Kennedy, accusing the US, highlighting its solidarity with working class 
around the world and demanding the withdrawal of US financial aids, advisers, troops and arms 
on 23 March 1962 (Luckhardt and Wall: 1980: 372). A statement made by one of the leaders of 
SACTU gives an important opportunity to understand the SACTU’s main idea: “We affirm that 
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peace will not come to workers as a gift but must be won through their own efforts” (Luckhardt 
and Wall, 1980: 372). The SACTU also established strong relations with progressive unions in 
Australia and New Zealand. It supported armed national liberation struggles of the  Movimento 
Popular da Libertação de Angola (MPLA) in Angola, the Partido Africano Para a Independência 
da Guiné e  Cabo-Verde (PAIGC)  in  Guine  and  The  Liberation  Front  of  Mozambique 
(FRELIMO) in Mozambique (Luckhardt and Wall: 1980: 376). 
SACTU also  established  factory  committees  aiming  to  democratize  and politicize  the 
existing trade unions and to build up new trade unions. One of the most important functions of 
these committees was to engage with new potential members and to deal with their problems in 
workplace by being their representatives. The committees were also seen as a means of realizing 
the  minimum  and  maximum  demands  of  the  communist  party.  In  other  words,  in  SACTU 
leaders’  view,  the  committees  would  play  a  crucial  role  in  socialist  transformation  in  South 
Africa (Lambert, 1988: 164-177). 
SACTU organized basic and advanced level educational programmes, in which Marxists 
analysis was taught, to strengthen its members’ theoretical knowledge. Democratic participation 
of workers or democracy in workplaces, class-consciousness and socialism were some content of 
these education programmes (Lambert, 1988: 231-243). 
After its formation, the SACTU decided to affiliate to WFTU. However, it never paid any 
affiliation  fees  because  of  political  security.  This  membership  remained  as  a  kind of  mutual 
ideological support with WFTU (Southall, 1995: 102). According to the SACTU, the ICFTU was 
an outcome of the Cold War and means of controlling of the labour movements of third world 
countries in favor of British and US imperialism. In spite of this, it always tried to take support 
from  all  international  trade  unions  and  federations.  Therefore,  between  1955  and  1963,  it 
contacted with the ICFTU and WFTU (Luckhardt and Wall, 1980: 371-381; Ncube, 1985: 98). 
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In the mid 1950s, SACTU and Congress Alliance launched a boycott campaign against 
the South African regime demanding international solidarity. However, neither the South African 
labour organizations,  such as TUCSA (and later  FOFATUSA), nor the ICFTU supported the 
campaign, although the ICFTU gave a support to the black working class in theory. To be sure, 
the  problem for  the  ICFTU was  the  political  unionism and ideological  positions  of  SACTU 
(Luckhardt and Wall, 1980:381). 
The Sharpeville Massacre, following a protest led by the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC) 
against the pass laws, ended in the shooting deaths of 69 and injuries of 180 unarmed Africans on 
March 1960 in a township, and became a turning point in terms of South African political sphere. 
After the Sharpeville, the ANC and PAC were banned, eighteen thousand people were arrested 
and more than five thousand were sentenced to terms in jail. At the same time, almost all leaders 
of the SACTU were banned in terms of trade union activities and forced into exile (Myers, 1980: 
66; Mokoena 1993: 14; Lulat, 2008: 70; Finnemore and Merwe, 1996: 32). However, it did not 
mean for SACTU leaders that the struggle came to end. In contrast, they maintained their struggle 
against apartheid in exile as well. 
 
4.2.3. Federation of Free African Trade Union of South Africa 
(FOFATUSA): The result of the control policies of TUCSA and US 
through the ICFTU 
The growing influence and political unionism of the SACTU was not acceptable for the 
apartheid government,  the TUCSA and the international trade union organizations.  Therefore, 
they,  especially  the  ICFTU and the TUCSA, tried  to  undermine  the SACTU by helping  the 
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establishment  of  FOFATUSA. In fact,  until  the 1957,  except  its  condemnation  of  the  South 
African regime at the ILO in 1954 and 1956, the South African affair was not taken to the agenda 
by the ICFTU (Southall, 1995: 103). 
In 1957, the General Secretary of the ICFTU visited Johannesburg and had a meeting with 
the TUCSA executive members. The subject of the meeting was the organizational problems of 
African workers. During the visit, they also had a meeting with the executive members of the 
SACTU.  The  intention  of  the  SACTU  was  to  affiliate  with  both  international  labour 
organizations, the ICFTU and the WFTU, in order to receive their support against apartheid (Ken 
and Wall, 1980:382). However, after the discussion with the SACTU, the ICFTU delegation was 
not optimistic about the relationship between the ICFTU and the SACTU because of different 
ideological positions between the two organisations. According to the delegation, the SACTU’s 
stance  was  parallel  with  the  communists  and  national  liberation  movement  of  South  Africa. 
Moreover,  the  SACTU  had  made  application  to  WFTU  for  affiliation  (Southall,  1995:103; 
Ncube, 1985: 98). Therefore, the ICFTU delegation reached a double conclusion that on one hand 
something should be done to prevent the SACTU from being affiliated the WFTU while the 
ICFTU support to encourage the formation of black trade unions should be provided through the 
TUCSA because of its non-political  stance on the other (Southall,  1995: 103; SADET, 2006: 
712). 
Two years  later,  in 1959,  another  delegation  from the ICFTU attended the  TUCSA’s 
annual conference. At the conference, a decision to organize all races in the country and to form 
an Interracial Organizing Committee was taken (Southall, 1995: 103). The ICFTU also started to 
support the attempts of the TUCSA in organizing African trade unions, as parallel organizations. 
However, according to ICFTU officials, the TUCSA had to change its image by following a more 
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militant route. The TUCSA welcomed these proposal because it needed to improve its position at 
the International Labour Organization (Ncube, 1985: 98). 
The ICFTU had offered 30.000 pound to the SACTU. However, at the same time, it had 
also  proposed  two  conditions  for  its  financial  and  political  support  to  the  SACTU:  Firstly, 
SACTU had to cut its political relations with the ANC and the South African Communist Party. 
Secondly, SACTU had to separate the economic and political struggle. However, the SACTU had 
neither  accepted  to embrace  a  non-political  stance nor the financial  aid  from the ICFTU. In 
addition,  SACTU had  reacted  against  the  attempts  of  the  ICFTU (Southall,  1995:  103-104; 
Luckhardt  and Wall,  1980).  Therefore,  the funds proposed by the ICFTU were given to  the 
TUCSA to organize  black workers (Nair,  2001:  163).  The result  of  this  process became the 
creation of FOFATUSA with support of the ICFTU and the TUCSA as a an alternative labour 
organization  to  SACTU less   than  four  months  after  the  ICFTU delegation  left  the  country 
(Southall, 1995: 104; Luckhardt and Wall,1980). 
FOFATUSA was established by five African trade unions which all opposed the political 
stance of the SACTU and its relations with the South African Communist Party and the ANC (Du 
Toit,  1981:  229).  This  federation  never  collaborated  with  the  SACTU  by  arguing  that 
FOFATUSA was interested in industrial politics and the wealth of workers through non-political 
and bread butter unionism, and not in party politics. However, it had important relations with the 
PAC, of which the formation was a reflection of Africanist anxiety about white domination of the 
national liberation movement as well as in labour movement (Du Toit, 1981: 229; Macshane at 
all, 1984: 32). For example, after the formation of the FOFATUSA, Nyaose, its president, was 
elected as labour secretary on the PAC’s national executive. Further, he was arrested because of 
his involvement with the PAC activities in 1960 (SADET, 2006: 712). 
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FOFATUSA  had  an  opportunistic  and  pragmatist  stance.  For  instance,  although  it 
followed a nationalist  policy,  it  affiliated to ICFTU and collaborated with TUCSA (Du Toit, 
1981: 229). Further, when  the TUCSA began to admit the African trade unions into its ranks, 
five African trade unions affiliated with FOFATUSA joined TUCSA in 1962 (Du Toit, 1981: 
218,230).  In  fact,  the  admission  of  African  trade  unions  to  TUCSA was  an  outcome of  the 
struggles with SACTU and the other progressive forces. However, the collaboration between the 
TUCSA and FOFATUSA was different from working class solidarity.  Rather, it was an example 
of the pragmatist  stance of the TUCSA and the FOSATU because African trade unions were 
being organized in order to improve TUCSA’s image in international arena (Nair, 2001: 163). 
FOFATUSA had also relations with the AALC and the AFL-CIO. Although the AALC 
did not open its South African office until the 1980s and did not become directly involved in 
South Africa until the late 1970s, it always supported bread and butter unionism in South Africa 
through  the  ICFTU,  TUCSA or  the  FOFATUSA.  The  main  concern  of  them was  to  create 
“responsible trade unionism”, which meant non-political and bread butter trade unionism as well 
as  non-critical  trade  unionism against  US investments  in  South  Africa.  There  might  be  two 
examples  of  their  interpretation  regarding  responsible  trade  unionism  in  South  Africa:  The 
TUCSA and the FOFATUSA. Therefore, the AALC and the AFL-CIO used these organizations 
as a means of the creation of the responsible trade unionism (Godfried, 1987: 57). 
The position of the leader of the National Union of Clothing Workers of the FOFATUSA 
was one of the best examples of this situation. Lucy Mvubelo, General Secretary of the National 
Union of Clothing Workers and a former vice-president of the SACTU, was a supporter of non-
political  unionism.  In  addition,  she  was  in  opposition  to  the  withdrawal  of  US corporations 
operating in South Africa. According to Mvubelo, these companies were creating new jobs for 
blacks by respecting their collective bargaining rights. In the next period, her union joined the 
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TUCSA as a ‘proof of the TUCSA's non-racial character’.  Not surprisingly,  in the 1970s, the 
AFL-CIO described her as a black ambassador for US trade unions (Godfried, 1987: 57). 
As mentioned above, the Durban strikes was a turning point of the South African labour 
movement. After the strikes, the ICFTU and the AALC began to implement a new South African 
policy,  which relied upon the idea of creating non-political trade unions in South Africa. For 
instance, Brown, who was the administrator of the AALC, announced that “the time had come for 
closer contacts with people and trade unions of South Africa” (quoted by Southall, 1995: 186). 
After  this  statement,  the  AALC  firstly  financed  the  trip  of  Mvubelo  to  participate  to  the 
International Trade Union Conference against to apartheid in June 1973. Secondly, Mvubelo was 
invited  to  the  annual  conferences  of  the  AALC  and  AFL-CIO  in  Miami  (Southall,  1995; 
Godfried, 1987). 
FOFATUSA,  which  existed  during  the  period  between  1959  and  1965,  could  not 
seriously challenge against apartheid and did not have a considerable influence within the South 
African labour movement (Macshane at all, 1984: 32; Godfried, 1987). However, it became a 
means of the control policies of the AFL-CIO, the ICFTU and the TUCSA. When the TUCSA, 
which had liaison committee with the FOFATUSA readmitted the African unions to its ranks, the 
FOFATUSA joined to the TUCSA by annihilating itself (Nair, 2001: 163).
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Chapter V
US investments in South Africa in the 1960s
As mentioned above, the Sharpeville Massacre became a turning point in terms of South 
African political sphere. Sharpeville was also an important threshold in terms of international 
economic and political relationships of South Africa. After Sharpeville, many international actors 
started to pay greater attention to the South African regime. Many social movements, institutions 
and states around the world showed great reactions against the massacre (Rogers, 1976: 102). For 
example, in 1962, the United Nations passed a resolution, which was accepted by a vote of 67 to 
16, with 23 abstentions. The Resolution included economic and diplomatic sanctions as well as 
arms embargo (Culverson, 1999:37). However, the US tried to restrain the extent of sanctions. 
According  to  the  US,  the  Sharpeville  Massacre  was  an  internal  problem  of  South  Africa. 
Additionally, official US South Africa foreign policy relied upon the idea that public recognition 
of the legitimacy of African protest would lead SA to limit US access to strategic minerals or 
close its ports to US fleets. Consequently, the result became a partial embargo limited with only 
weapon sales to South Africa in 1964 (ibid, 37). 
One of the reactions was the withdrawal of foreign investments from the country because 
the  massacre  had  broken  the  confidence  of  foreign  investors.  According  to  many  foreign 
investors  operating  in  South  Africa  (although  US investors  were  largely  an  exception),  the 
Sharpeville Massacre might have been a herald of  revolution (Lulat, 2008: 70). As a result, after 
Sharpeville,  South Africa was faced with a major foreign capital  outflow. In fact,  during the 
period between 1957 and 1959,  South Africa had already encountered  a net  capital  outflow. 
However, after the Sharpeville Massacre this outflow considerably accelerated. In so much as 
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that,  in  1960,  approximately  271  million  dollars  or  almost  50  percent  of  foreign  exchange 
reserves were withdrawn from the country. This tendency continued during following years. In 
early 1961, a further 63 million dollars left from SA. Again with the exception of US capital 
(which  largely  stayed  put),  these  withdrawals  continued  until  1964.  Finally  in  1964,  the 
government was able to put a stop to withdrawals of foreign capital thanks to implementation of 
regulations aiming at exchange controls, which were introduced in 1961 (Rogers, 1976: 96-102; 
Lulat,  2008:  70).  However,  the  most  effective  factor  in  stopping  capital  outflows  was  not 
exchange controls but was US investments and financial support which prevented an eventual 
deep recession in South Africa (Lulat, 2008: 70-71).
Although President  Kennedy  and  his  successor  Johnson  had  criticized  the  apartheid 
practice of the white government of South Africa, the United States did not accept the embargo, 
economic  sanctions  and  reactions  against  the  country  (Culverson,  1999:37).  In  contrast,  it 
established  important  relationships  ranging  from  energy  issues  to  economic   and  political 
supports to and military relationships with South Africa (Culverson, 1999:42). After the 1960s, 
especially,  when the role of Britain in South Africa started to weaken and after South Africa 
withdrew from the British Commonwealth in 1961, operations of American corporations as well 
as political institutions became increasingly important elements in the South African economic 
and political process (Seidman and Seidman, 1978: 11). In this context in December 1961, for 
example,  the  US  and  South  Africa  signed  an  agreement  to  establish  missile  range  tracking 
facilities in South Africa. Moreover, the United States started to sell military equipment to South 
Africa.  However,  according  to  the  agreement,  the  military  equipment  was  for  ‘external’  use 
rather than for use against internal opponents of apartheid (Culverson, 1999:41). Relationships 
between  two  states,  from  submarine  selling  to  uranium  enrichment  programs,  to  the 
establishment of NASA facilities and to delivery of nuclear reactors continued for mny years. In 
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other  words,  although  the  United  Stated  tried  to  be  seen  as  an  opponent  of  apartheid,  it 
maintained very strong, and critically important, relations with the White governments of South 
Africa (Mokoena, 1993:14-16). In addition,, the CIA also started to play a significant role in the 
country. One of the activities of the CIA was to coordinate and train South Africa’s intelligence 
services. Additionally it assisted the anti-communist white government to infiltrate and destroy 
liberal  as  well  as  radical  opposition  groups.  The  agency  also  helped  the  South  African 
government in the capture of Nelson Mandela underground leader of the ANC in August 1963 
(Culverson, 1999: 42). 
After the Sharpeville Massacre, another concern for the South African government was to 
gain legitimacy, create an acceptable image and promote the country as an attractive place for 
foreign  investments  for  US  capital.  To  realize  these  aims,  a  semi  official  South  African 
institution, the South African Foundation established offices in New York and Washington after 
the  Sharpeville  Massacre.  Additionally,  the  South  African  Government  hired  a  number  of 
American public relations companies, published periodicals and brochures, and broadcasted films 
through the information office which had been established in 1948 which was funded to the 
extent of $4,459,000 during 1965-1966 by the NP government. Between 1963 and 1964, officials 
from the information office participated in 60 television shows and  gave 50 radio interviews and 
100 lectures in New York (Culverson, 1999:41; Hull, 1979: 81). From the point of view of the 
apartheid government, there were different reasons for such a public relations campaign in the 
US. Firstly, foreign capital and US official support would provide information, technology and 
managerial knowledge to the South African regime, and these would help to the modernization of 
its economy.  Secondly,  foreign capital  would create a dynamic economy,  because of that  the 
South African regime would defend itself against African nationalism, which been an important 
element of the African political sphere since the late fifties and which led to the end of white 
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minority regimes in Mozambique, Angola, and Zimbabwe in the mid-seventies. In other words, 
the apartheid  regime  would be able  to  sustain  its  racist  socio-economic  and political  system 
thanks to this policy (Lulat, 2008: 70-77). Thirdly, US investments and official support would 
lead  South Africa  to  gain legitimacy in  the  African  and world political  arena  (Seidman  and 
Seidman, 1978: 12). 
On  the  other  hand,  South  Africa  was  an  indispensable  investment  area  as  well  as  a 
political  partner for the US for a number of reasons. This indispensability of SA for the US 
derived  from  some  features  of  the  country.  Firstly,  South  Africa  had  noteworthy  mineral 
resources which were very important for the US. This can be understood from a statement, made 
by  Andrew  Kamarck  the  former  economic  advisor  on  Africa  at  the  International  Bank  for 
Reconstruction  and  Development-World  Bank.  According  to  Kamarck,  World  War  II  had 
resulted in a significant shift in the US position in the world economy. Thus, although the US was 
a large net exporter of raw materials before the war, it became a large net importer after the war 
as a result of the economic boom of the post Second World War era. Therefore, it needed to look 
abroad for raw materials  (Mackler,  1972: 43).  Another dimension was illustrated by Paul G. 
Hoffman who worked as Marshall Plan Administrator for long time. Hoffman highlighted the 
necessity  for  the  United  States  to  find new external  sources  of  raw materials.  According  to 
Hoffman, the US economy was  increasingly dependent on different places around the world for 
raw materials (Mackler, 1972: 43). Besides, an official American government report published in 
the mid-1950s indicated that if relationships with the nations which supplied mineral sources to 
the United States were destroyed, it would pose big risks for the US (Mackler, 1972:44).
Another important feature of South Africa was its cheap labour force which derived from 
unequal  living  and  working  conditions  between  white  and  black  workers.  These  racial 
inequalities provided a high level of exploitation of the black working class. The significance of 
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cheap labour for US investors can be understood from a statement made by the president of the 
Jeffrey Company of Ohio, which opened a new factory in Germiston in 1965. The president 
stressed that they had complete faith in the soundness of the South African economy, and so they 
were making further investments all in good care (Mackler, 1972:27).  The attraction of South 
Africa for foreign investors was also evident from colonial period that many colonial states in 
early periods wanted to settle in the country. The country’s strategic geographical location, rich 
agricultural resources and satisfying climate were among the most basic reasons of why foreign 
investors were racing to invest in SA (Seidman and Seidman, 1978: 9)
Given  the  combination  of  these  various  factors,  the  American  business  community 
considered the country as an investment paradise with cheap labour and rich natural resources. 
According to them, South Africa, with its very cheap labour force, offered a highly attractive 
investment atmosphere and so could offer big profit opportunities for them. In addition, many 
American journals or magazines in the US described the country as having  “a good investment 
climate”. In particular, four reasons were indicated to investors: low wages for Africans, plentiful 
unskilled  labour,  rarity  of  strikes  and high returns  (Mackler,  1972:27).  The  study mentioned 
above, also clarified this situation. Accordingly, African labour was cheap and if African workers 
had been paid as much as white workers, and if skill differentials had been narrowed, the wage 
costs of an employer would have increased enormously (Mackler, 1972:37). 
As a conclusion, the US capitalist class and the South African regime had overlapping 
interests in the development of economical and political relations between two countries. In other 
words, the intention of the administrators of the South African regime was to strengthen their 
racist social regime through economical and political support of the US government; in return, 
the aim of US investors was to benefit from the investment advantages offered by  apartheid 
conditions  (Lulat,  2008:  77).  Additionally,  because  of  apartheid  with  its  very  strong  anti-
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communist stance, the US, one of whose most important aims was to fight against communism 
around the world, would be able to have an anti-communist  partner in the African continent. 
Obviously,  white  governments  in the African continent,  especially the apartheid government, 
were very suitable partners for such a political aim (Seidman and Seidman, 1978:11).
Under these circumstances and political developments, while many international actors 
reacted against the South African government, American corporations continued to make direct 
and indirect investments in South Africa. After the capital outflows of the post-Sharpeville period 
in 1960s, American capital,  seeking cheap labour power,  new natural  sources,  raw materials, 
profitable  investments  areas  and new markets  for their  huge production,  provided net capital 
inflow into South Africa thereafter (Rogers, 1976:102, Seidman and Seidman, 1978). 
Thus American investments and businesses in South Africa played a significant role. For 
US based multinational corporations and financial institutions, this was a very suitable period to 
access  South Africa. Many US firms, which were marginal in South Africa before the Second 
World  War,  realized  new investments  in  the  country  (Seidman  and  Seidman,  1978:11).  US 
corporations  applied  three methods to  assist  the  South African regime.  Firstly,  as mentioned 
above,  they  made  their  investments  at  a  very  critical  period.  Secondly,  they  invested  in 
economically strategic sectors, such as heavy industry, defence and automobiles. Thirdly, they 
provided very high-level technology and equipment to South Africa and by doing so they helped 
the apartheid regime (Lulat, 2008: 71). 
One of the most important industries in which US investments were important was the 
automobile  sector,  which  had  been  described  as  key  industry  by  the  apartheid  government 
because of its strategic and military importance, and manufacturing industries (Lulat, 2008: 72). 
Starting from 1959, US investments in manufacturing industry had grown four times reaching to 
50 percent of the US total in the 1970s (Rogers, 1976:125). Similarly, the automobile industry 
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and its profitability were also important for US investors. Therefore, during the apartheid era, 
many big  American  corporations,  such  as  Ford  and General  Motors,  kept  their  investments, 
whilst a number them established new factories in South Africa (Rogers, 1976:125, Culverson, 
1999: 40). Specifically,  three big US corporations, General Motors, Ford and Chrysler played a 
significant role in the South African economy during the period (Seidman and Seidman, 1978: 
98). In fact, General Motors and Ford had established their first factories in South Africa after the 
World War I. However, they increased their investments in South Africa after the Sharpeville 
Massacre in contrast to other foreign investors. For example, Ford’s first factory in South Africa 
was established in 1923, as a subsidiary of its Canadian subsidiary. The company expanded its 
investments especially in the 1960s (Seidman and Seidman, 1978: 99). Chrysler, which was the 
third largest US auto manufacturer of US, established its first factory in South Africa in 1958. In 
1967, it established a new factory close to the Tswana Bantustan. The reason for establishing the 
factory in that region was to benefit from the large unskilled black labour reserve (Seidman and 
Seidman,  1978:  99).  During  the  1960s  and  1970s,  these  three  auto  companies  made  many 
investments in South Africa because of the national requirement of SA that over half the elements 
of vehicles had to be locally produced. However, there was another reason to make so much 
investment in that they competed with each other to sell vehicles to the South African army and 
police  force  (Seidman  and Seidman,  1978:  98).  Therefore,  by  1970,  General  Motors’  South 
Africa investments reached $220 million; whilst the investments of Ford and Sigma investments 
(Chrysler’s South African partner) reached $245 million and $117 million respectively.  These 
three companies expanded so rapidly  that after the sixties they controlled nearly 50 percent of 
the automobile market in South Africa (Rogers, 1976:125, Culverson, 1999: 40). In addition to 
these companies, many US companies, such as Union Carbide, Newmont Mining, Phelps Dodge, 
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Kennecott, American Metal Climax, made indirect investments in the South African automobile 
sector (Lulat, 2008: 72). 
Mining  and  smelters,  petroleum,  machinery,  equipment  production  and  information 
technologies were among other investment areas of US corporations. After Sharpeville, about 10 
percent of the American corporate investments were made in mining and smelting. Consequently 
South African mines and smelters doubled from about $78 million to $158 millionr from 1968 to 
1973  (Seidman  and  Seidman,  1978:87;  Davis,  1978:  291).  Meanwhile,  the  involvement  of 
American corporations in the petroleum sector reached  44 percent during the 1970s. In dollar 
terms, petroleum was the second most important investment area of US corporations in South 
Africa  (Seidman  and  Seidman,  1979:  107-8).  Petroleum  investments  also  provided  critical 
support to the South African regime, for the apartheid government were to face a blockade on oil 
imports, the South African economy, especially its modern industry, would face serious problems 
(Seidman and Seidman, 1978: 107). John Deere, General Electric, Caterpillar, Dresser, Firestone 
and Goodyear, Motorola, ITT, Kodak, 3M were examples of US investors investing in machinery 
and equipment sector. They produced different goods, including agricultural equipment, diesel 
locomotives,  electrical  and  electronic  products,  rubber  products,  construction  equipment, 
communication equipment, especially for the police force and the army, film and film materials. 
Some US companies also made investments to operate nuclear reactors in South Africa. As for 
information  technologies,  Control  Data,  Burroughs,  Sperry  Rand,  International  Business 
Machines (IBM), Hewlett-Packard, National Cash Register (NCR), Mohawk Data Sciences, and 
Computer Sciences were some examples of corporations making investments in the sector (Lulat, 
2008: 72; Davis, 1978: 291; Lulat, 2008: 72-73). 
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Almost  every  companies  invested  in  South  Africa  had  relationships  with  two  big 
Rockefeller  Banks,  namely  The  First  National  City  Bank  and  Chase  Manhattan  Bank.   US 
companies’ integration into the South African economy was facilitated by these banks, while they 
themselves had their own investments in South Africa (Seidman and Seidman, 1978:82). The 
Chase Manhattan Bank had opened its first branch in South Africa in 1959. In 1965, the openings 
of  three  new branches  followed.  The  First  National  City  Bank,  which  had  started  to  make 
investments in South Africa one year before the Chase Manhattan Bank, also opened eight new 
branches especially in industrial centers in 1973 (Seidman and Seidman, 1978: 114-115). Further, 
these banks also became a part of the consortium organized by Charles Engelhand, who  was 
largest  single  investor  in  South  Africa  with  direct  control  of  twenty-three  major  enterprises 
including gold and uranium mining through chairmanship of Rand Mines, to provide 40 million 
loans to the South African government just after the Sharpeville (Seidman and Seidman, 1978: 
116). 
Engelhand also played  a  critical  role  in  terms of political  and economic  relationships 
between the US and South Africa. He was in a position to contribute effectively to this goal for 
two  reasons.  The  first  was  that  two  years  before  Sharpeville,  when  the  white  government 
encountered  important  economic  problems,  he  established  the  American-South  African 
Investment Corporation aiming to attract American capital back into the Republic. Engelhand 
also served on the board of two official South African agencies, the Witwatersrand Native labour 
Association and the Native Recruiting Agency. Additionally he was the founder of the South 
Africa Foundation as well. During the period, especially, after the 1960s, many US companies 
proclaimed  their  faith  in  South  Africa’s  future  because  of  the  work  conducted  by  this 
organization  (Culverson,  1999:38-39;  Seidman  and  Seidman,  1978:89).  In  other  words, 
Engelhand had key relationships with the white government in South Africa and made significant 
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contributions to the apartheid regime (Culverson, 1999:39; Seidman and Seidman, 1978:88-89). 
The second reason was that he also had relationships with US policy makers as well as with its 
investors. For example,  he had very close relationships with US president Johnson and made 
serious financial contributions to the Democratic Party of US. In other words, as a racial liberal at 
home  he  supported  and  benefited  from racial  oppression  in  a  different  country  (Culverson, 
1999:39; Seidman and Seidman, 1978:89). After the Sharpeville massacre, Engelhard arranged a 
$35 million loan by the United States banking interests.  Additionally,  the First National  City 
Bank supplied two more loans amounting to $25 million dollars for two state owned enterprises 
of South Africa, Eskom and the South African Railways in September 1961. Moreover, under the 
leadership  of  Engelhand,  a  group  of  American  entrepreneurs  and  international  financial 
institutions including Chase Manhattan Bank, the IMF, the World Bank, First National Bank, 
City Bank, and some investors not publicly identified raised a $150 million dollar loan for the 
South  African  government  (Seidman  and  Seidman,  1978:  88;  Culverson,  1999:  39;  Rogers, 
1976:102-103;  Lulat,  2008:  70).  Engelhand’s  critical  support  for  the  apartheid  government 
indicated  that  South  Africa’s  relationships  with  American  investors  and  public  sector  policy 
makers were firm and fast. As such, they constituted a major obstacle confronting anti apartheid 
activists (Culverson, 1999:39). 
Another  actor,  which  played  an  important  role  in  terms  of  relationships  between 
American capital and South Africa, was the Anglo American Corporation. This company worked 
with Engelhand and other foreign investors, and by doing so, it gained important advantages in 
the post Sharpeville era by strengthening its position in mining and defense (Culverson, 1999: 
40). Although Harry Oppenheimer, the major owner of the company, was one of the financiers of 
the  Progressive Party which was the opposition party of South Africa, his behavior can be cited 
as hypocritical as can be illustrated by the following sentence:  
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…civilized standards which were brought to Africa by Europeans, can by no means be reduced to 
the doctrine of manhood sufferance or anything approaching it, instead of being a guarantee of  
individual liberty, it would lead directly to inefficiency, corruption and tyranny. [Therefore] what  
we should not do is to put uneducated people, still in a semi-barbarous state,  in charge of a  
developing country like South Africa (Lulat, 2008: 78-79).
What  was  important  for  Oppenheimer  was  the  safety  of  capitalist  system,  which  was  being 
threatened by black resistance movement (Lulat, 2008: 79).
As pointed out above,  after  1960, US direct  and indirect  investments  in South Africa 
started to increase and these investments played a significant role. For example whereas in 1961, 
direct American investments were $23 million, this increased to $448 million in 1962 (Culverson, 
1999:40). American investments in South Africa increased by $964 million in 1971 and reached 
$1240  million  in  1973.  In  other  words,  in  the  period  between  1962  and  1973  American 
investments saw an almost 340 percent increase (Rogers, 1976:124). By the end of the sixties, the 
total  foreign  investment  in  South  Africa  was  $4.86  billion,  and  about  one  fifth  of  these 
investments were made only by U.S. corporations (Lulat,  2008: 71).  Towards the end of the 
1970s, the US became the second largest investor of South Africa. At that time, 17 percent of all 
foreign direct investments, and 33 percent indirect investments in South Africa were realized by 
US investors. Accordingly, the amount of US direct investments was $ 1.665 billion, whilst the 
amount of US indirect investments in South Africa a little more than $2 billion (Lulat, 2008: 71). 
In South Africa, US multinational corporations’ investments were generally made for the long 
term. Their investments represented 20 percent of all total foreign long-term direct investments 
and only about 10 percent of total foreign indirect investments (Seidman and Seidman, 1978: 75). 
The number of corporations invested in South Africa was between 250 and 3004 including 
nine of the ten largest corporations in the Fortune 500 list. Twelve of the corporations made up 
4 Different scholars give different amounts with regard to the number of US investments. For example, according to 
Lulat (2008), it was 275, according to Davis, it was 250 and according to Rogers (1976), it was 300.
87
70 percent of all American capital invested in South Africa, and no more than 30 corporations 
were  the  most  significant  in  terms  of  total  capital  invested.  For  example,  the  three  auto 
companies,  Ford,  GM and Chrysler  represented   together  over 25 percent  while  Mobil  Oil’s 
investments constituted around 13.6 percent of all investments (Rogers, 1976: 126). However, the 
leading American investor in South Africa was General Motors, which was the biggest single 
corporation in the US (Davis, 1978: 291; Lulat, 2008: 71; Rogers, 1976: 126; Davis, 291). 
As  a  conclusion  of  these  strong  economical  and  political  relations,  in  1978,  the  US 
became the leading partner of South Africa , replacing Britain. In that year, South Africa’s export 
to the US reached $ 2.34 billion from $ 108 million in 1960, whilst its export to Britain remained 
at $1.08 billion (Lulat, 2008: 71) 
In  retrospect,  it  is  clear  that  US investments  played  an  important  role  in  the  capital 
accumulation  process  of  South  Africa.  Indeed,  direct  and  indirect  investments  made  by  US 
investors financed 11 percent of South Africa’s gross domestic investment, and its share in new 
investment in industrial sectors increased from 24.4 percent in 1956 to 33.7 percent in 1970. The 
loan which became possible thanks to Engelhand, was very critical for South African economy 
particularly  because  of  withdrawal  of  foreign capital  from the  country after  Sharpeville.  For 
example, because of $98.4 millionr transferred by the US to South Africa in 1970, South Africa’s 
foreign reserves multiplied by four. This was a major fillip for the Republic (Rogers, 1976:96). 
Foreign capital  and relationships between the US public policy makers provided  vital 
possibilities which could not be undervalued not just for the economy but also for the military 
capability,  technological  development  and infrastructure  of  South Africa (Rogers,  1976: 102, 
Culverson,  1999:  40).  For  instance,  because  of  US  investments,  ESCOM,  one  of  the  most 
important state-owned enterprises, was able to reduce its dependency on oil by building facilities 
using  nuclear  power  or  coal.  This  also  provided  additional  opportunities  for  South  African 
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industry, because as mentioned above, South Africa did not have enough oil reserves so it had to 
import petroleum from abroad  (Seidman and Seidman, 1978: 107). The apartheid regime also 
benefited from US investments in mining where low paid migrant workers were employed in 
general.  US investments  and supports  provided  modern  technologies  to  this  industrial  sector 
which  helped  to  maximize  profits  (Seidman  and  Seidman,  1978:  88).  In  terms  of  military 
capacity  of  South  Africa,  in  addition  to  the  military  and  strategically  important  agreements 
between the US and South Africa in the beginning of the sixties, especially investments of US 
companies  in  information  sector  guaranteed  another  important  opportunity  to  control  black 
population. The fingerprinting of fifteen million Africans, which was two-thirds of all African 
population, was recorded and kept by the apartheid government in a data bank in 1978 thanks to 
the information technologies. Additionally, with the great help of US information technologies 
investments the apartheid government’s  intelligence services and police force became able to 
watch and record almost all anti apartheid activities (Lulat, 2008: 73). 
American  investors  also  obtained  significant  profit  opportunities  thanks  to  the  cheap 
labour force and natural  sources in South Africa.   90 per cent of the profit  made by  the  US 
manufacturing companies in the continent was coming only from South Africa (Seidman and 
Seidman, 1978:  96).  Additionally, the most influential US companies invested in South Africa 
had an important contacts with the apartheid government as well as with the private sector of 
South Africa. On these grounds, American corporations would be able to become a part of the 
decision process of the country (Seidman and Seidman, 1978: 111).
However, new investments and industrialization process did not mean better living and 
working  standards  for  the  majority  of  the  country.  In  contrast,  the  incomes  of  the  Africans 
working in factories, mines and farms were far less than the incomes of whites. Additionally, 
almost  all  US  corporations  were  paying  black  workers  below  the  effective  minimum  level 
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(Rogers,  1976:147).  Therefore,  four  fifths  of  unskilled  urban  African  workers  suffered  from 
undernourishment  whilst  one-third  African  infants  died  before  celebrating  even  their  first 
birthday  (Seidman  and  Seidman,  1978:  19-23).  Moreover,  US  investors  complained  about 
various restrictions imposed on the use of black labour but their concern was profit rather than 
the  problems  of  black  workers  themselves.   Not  surprisingly,  they  had  no  agenda  for  the 
establishment of negotiating for machinery or higher wages for blacks. They also had a positive 
stance  about  ‘job  fragmentation’  (Rogers,  1976:  153).  In  an  interview  with  an  American 
businessmen who had investments in South Africa , it became clear that American investors were 
unanimously opposed to trade unions for Africans (Rogers, 1976: 154). One of the managers of 
the Good-Year Tire Company, which had made huge investments in South Africa, pointed out 
that US economic activity in South Africa had to be ‘counterrevolutionary’ by opposing radical 
political  changes  within  the  system  (Lulat,  2008:  70-71).   The  general  idea  behind  this 
perspective was that they were just responsible for their shareholders, who invested their money 
in the belief that the management of the corporation would consider the interests of shareholders 
(Rogers, 1976: 149). 
Despite the increase in US investments, the South African economy started to experience 
problems by the seventies. A first major problem was the rise in black resistance movements 
against apartheid. The intensification of the repression of blacks through apartheid had led to the 
intensification  of  black  resistance  against  the  system.  Although,  the  apartheid  government’s 
response against the resistance movement came with different attempts to oppress antiapartheid 
movements,  all  these pressures led to an intensification of black resistance movement  (Lulat, 
2008: 77).  For foreign investors  in the country,  all  these meant  more vulnerable,  unsafe and 
instable investment environment. In addition to the increasing political struggle against apartheid, 
South  Africa  also  faced  problems  in  terms  of  capital  accumulation  process  in  this  process 
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(Davies, 1979: 184). After the sixties, South Africa had encountered an overproduction problem. 
During  the  period,   although whites’  purchasing  power considerably  increased,  this  was  not 
enough to realize suitable profit rates because of very low purchasing power. In other words, the 
size of the market started to become insufficient for foreign investors. In addition, there was a 
skilled labour shortage in certain production areas (Lulat, 2008: 77; Davies, 1979). 
These problems led to a reduction in profit rates. As a result, the South African economy 
began to lose its attractiveness for foreign investors because it could not provide premium rates of 
return for foreign investments. Political risks, derived from the antiapartheid movements, in the 
country also fed this situation (Davies, 1979: 188). Therefore, especially after the mid-seventies, 
many US companies began to look for new investment areas in the African continent and they 
made important investments in Nigeria and Libya. For example, the return of US capital invested 
in these countries went above that US capital invested in South Africa in 1976. Towards the ends 
on the seventies, foreign investors became more critical oft the South African regime. One of the 
basic focal point of these critiques was that the South African government should create a more 
attractive environment  by repealing the job reservation system and similar legislation (Davies, 
1979: 191). In other words, both domestic and foreign investors started to oppose to the apartheid 
system  (Lulat,  2008:  78).  Consequently,  the  apartheid  system  had  reached  its  natural  and 
structural limits because of its ineffectiveness for capitalist class in a specific historical period of 
accumulation process in the country.   
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Chapter VI
US Labour Relations with the Trade Union Council of 
South Africa (TUCSA), 1960-1973 
As  during the  1960s  and  1970s,  US  investments  in  South  Africa  increased,  so  US 
overseas labour  policies  carried  out  by the AFL-CIO also increased in  the country.  In  other 
words, US overseas labour activities in South Africa followed US investments. However, at the 
beginning of the 1960s, there was a problem for the AFL-CIO about which labour organization 
would be the most suitable partner in its activities in South Africa, one which would be anti-
communist and non-political in terms of trade unionism understanding, and influential in terms of 
the number of its members. 
The potential partner of the AFL-CIO had to provide a possibility of influencing the black 
workers in line with business trade unionism. The AFL-CIO had three options: SACTU, TUCSA 
and FOFATUSA. As showed above, SACTU’s trade unionism understanding relied heavily upon 
political unionism and it had strong relations with the Congress Alliance. In addition, after the 
Sharpeville  Massacre,  many members  of SACTU were forced into exile,  arrested and killed. 
Further, some of them joined the Umkhonto we Sizwe, which was the armed wing of the ANC. 
Not surprisingly, given the state of political oppression, SACTU was by the late 1960s inactive in 
the South African labour movement (Braverman, 1967: 54-58). However, if it had been an active 
agent of the labour movement of South Africa in the 1960s, it still would not have been a suitable 
partner for the AFL-CIO because of its political and leftist trade unionism understanding. The 
second option,  FOFATUSA, in  whose  formation  the  AFL-CIO had played  a  significant  role 
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through the ICFTU, could be a suitable partner for the overseas labour activities of AFL-CIO 
because of its non-political trade union understanding, anti-communist stance and relations with 
the ICFTU, in which the AFL-CIO had a dominant position during the 1960s. In fact, the AFL-
CIO  maintained  strong  relations  with  FOFATUSA  through  the  ICFTU  after  its  formation, 
notably  via  Irving  Brown,  who  was  one  of  the  most  important  people  within  the  overseas 
operations of AFL-CIO (Braverman, 1967: 54-58). However, FOFATUSA did not have a major 
influence over the South African labour movement because of the number of its members. 
As  for TUCSA,  firstly,  it  was  the  biggest  trade  union  federation  of  South  Africa. 
Secondly,  as showed above,  it  had a non-political/business trade unionism understanding and 
anti-communist stance as the AFL-CIO had. Therefore, it was a suitable partner for the AFL-
CIO. However,  there  was a problem that TUCSA was not accepting blacks as members  and 
because of this situation, it could not affiliate to the ICFTU. In addition, TUCSA’s discriminatory 
policies were not suitable for the AFL-CIO in controlling black workers through this federation. 
Therefore, the AFL-CIO pressured the TUCSA through the ICFTU to begin to admit blacks. As a 
result, TUCSA amended its constitution in the beginning of the 1960s and began to accept blacks 
as members (Braverman, 1967: 54). Additionally, during the 1960s and 1970s, TUCSA declared 
its stance as anti-communist in every possible situation (Braverman, 1967: 57-58). All of these 
aspects meant that there was no longer any problem for the AFL-CIO in establishing relations 
with TUCSA and thus to influence the South African labour movement. Therefore, during the 
1960s and 1970s,  relations  between the AFL-CIO and TUCSA intensified and the AFL-CIO 
supported TUCSA and member unions in different manners (Trewhela, 1991: 84).  
The  AFL-CIO  maintained  its  relations  with  TUCSA directly  or  through different  US 
institutions  including  the  US  State  Department  and  US  Labour  Department.  Besides,  these 
relations  relied  heavily  upon the idea  that  TUCSA was the most  important  representative  of 
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South African labour.  As following sentences  of an official  from the US consulate  in  South 
Africa show, 
TUCSA is the only truly representative trade union federating body in the republic. Those unions  
or federating bodies which exclude workers from their ranks on the basis of colour violate the  
basic precepts of trade unionism and deserve little or no considerations from the international  
movements, except the scorn, criticism and denunciation  they are so rightly accorded. Because  
TUCSA is the only real trade union in this country, all the burdens fall on its shoulders. It, as the  
one body representing only a portion of all  workers in South Africa,  must do a job which is  
presently taxing all the facilities of the AFL-CIO in the US (TUCSA Newsletter, May 1967).
At the  same  time,  the  US  Embassy  in  South  Africa,  which  always  employed  labour 
officials, played a significant role in the relations between the TUCSA and US organizations, as 
news about  Ed Splain,  who was a  labour  official  in the US Embassy in  South Africa,  from 
TUCSA Newsletter shows: 
 …He was closely associated with TUCSA and its affiliated trade unions, and has played  
an important role in the United States and other overseas countries in building up the co-
ordinating body’s reputation as a progressive minded organization and the leading voice  
of the South African workers (TUCSA Newsletter, 14-16, May 1967)
One  of  the  examples  of  the  relations  between  TUCSA  and  the  AFL-CIO  was  the 
formation of TUCSA’s research bureau with the support of AFL-CIO. In 1965, at its eleventh 
congress, TUCSA decided to establish a research bureau. After the decision, Grobbelear, who 
was the General Secretary of the federation, sent a letter to the AFL-CIO, asking how such a 
bureau should be constituted. Grobbelear also asked a question about how a suitable staff would 
be for such a  bureau and whether  the AFL-CIO could recommend a suitable  person for the 
bureau, stating that although there were some qualified economists in South Africa, it was not 
possible  to  find  a  suitable  person  because  of  the  lack  of  concentration  on  the  needs  and 
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requirements of labour movement among South African economists (Letter from J.A. Grobbelear 
to George Meany, May 1965). In the next period, the AFL-CIO made important contributions to 
the establishment of TUCSA’s research bureau. 
TUCSA’s Education and Training Department was also established and headed by labour 
consultants recommended by the AFL-CIO. In 1965, for example, Eugene Gene Weisman, who 
was  a  trade  union  educator,  labour  expert  and  the  former  president  of  the  Retail  Clerk’s 
International Association in the United States, with which TUCSA established strong relations 
during the 1960s and 1970s, came to South Africa for five months to assist the establishment of 
education department of TUCSA (TUCSA Newsletter,  May 1965). In 1966, Weisman visited 
South  Africa  again  to  advise  and  help  the  launching  of  TUCSA’s  national  educational  and 
training  programme.  Wiseman  played  so  critical  role  in  the  formation  of  the  Education  and 
Training Department of TUCSA that in the next period, he was accepted as honorary life member 
by three TUCSA unions, the Federation of Leather Trade Unions, the South African Council of 
Transport Workers, and the South African Boilermakers’, Iron and Steelworkers’, Shipbuilders’ 
and Welders’ Society. Furthermore, in 1967, he was awarded with a gold medal by the President 
of TUCSA, T.P.Murray,  at  TUCSA’s Thirteenth Annual Conference in Cape Town (TUCSA 
Newsletter, May 1967). 
During  the  1960s  and  1970s,  TUCSA’s  education  and  training  department  organized 
many  activities  whose  theme  was  anticommunism  in  collaboration  with  the  AFL-CIO.  For 
example, in 1965, the department launched a study class. In the first lecture of the class, what was 
discussed was the role of communism in South Africa and in the world. In the next period, the 
department made many publications attacking communism to distribute overseas as well as to the 
members of TUCSA. For example, according to one of the brochures publicized by the TUCSA 
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Education  and  Training  Department,  enlightened  capitalism  was  better  than  communism for 
workers in  terms of the earning of workers (Braverman,  1967, 57-58).  In these publications, 
TUCSA was showed as at  the forefront of the struggle against  communism in South Africa. 
Besides,  during the period,  TUCSA organized many anti-communist  activities.  Almost  all  of 
them were supported by the CIA through the AFL-CIO as well as by the apartheid government 
(Braverman, 1967, 58).
In addition to educational activities, information and publication sharing was one of the 
most  important  elements  of relations  between TUCSA and AFL-CIO. During the 1960s and 
1970s, TUCSA took many publications from the AFL-CIO to circulate AFL-CIO’s opinions in 
different matters to its members. For instance, in 1962, Dick Long from the AFL-CIO suggested 
some AFL-CIO and the US Department of Labour publications to TUCSA through Donoghue, 
who was the General Secretary of TUCSA, for circulation among African workers. The first of 
them was “Technical Assistance Aid No 5: Electing Union Officers” and the second was “How 
to Run a Union Meeting”.  Copies of the items suggested by the AFL-CIO5 were distributed to 
TUCSA through the American consulate in South Africa (Letter From P. O’Donoghue to Ed. 
Splain, 18 June 1962; Letter from American Consulate General to O’Donoghue, 19 June 1962). 
Another example of publication sharing between the AFL-CIO and TUCSA was that in the early 
1960s,  US government  offered  to  pay  the  subscription  fees  of  some  American  journals  and 
magazines to TUCSA, including National Geographic, Holiday, Harper’s, Yale Review, Current 
History,  Forbes,  American  Economic  Review,  Theatre  Arts,  New  Yorker,  Foreign  Affairs, 
International  Affairs  (Letter  from  American  Embassy  to  Scpheepers,  undated).  In  the  same 
period, the AFL-CIO offered TUCSA some movies produced by the US Information Service, 
stating  that  the number  of  movies  produced by US Information  Services,  under  the  head  of 
5 Long suggested the TUCSA 200 copies. However, the TUCSA demanded 50 copies.
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Industry and Labour, would be free for South African groups through free registration with the 
United  States  Information  Services  (USIS)  film  library  (Letter  From  O’Donoghue  to  the 
Secretary of TUCSA, November 1962). In 1968, the administrators of TUCSA were invited to a 
special  showing of showcase American  documentary films  organized  by the US Information 
Service through the Consulate  General  of  the United  States  of America.  In the activity,  two 
movies, ‘1776’, which was about the declaration US independence, and ‘Garden of Eden’, which 
was about  the history of the motion  movie  and the role  of craftsmen who made the motion 
picture, were screened (Consulate General of the United States of America, undated). A month 
after this activity, TUCSA’s General Secretary Grobbelear asked for a film produced by a local 
trade union in the US to screen to trade unions in South Africa (Letter from Grobbelear to United 
States Information Service, 27 February 1968). 
As  shown  above,  the  AFL-CIO  provided  many  publications  to  TUCSA.  However, 
TUCSA  also  provided  important  information  to  the  AFL-CIO  regarding  different  matters 
including South Africa’s political developments and its labour movement. In addition, during the 
period, many labour experts and delegations from the US visited South Africa to gain information 
about  the  industrial  system and labour  movement  of  the country.  Many of  these visits  were 
organized in collaboration with TUCSA or the visitors coming from the US were directed by 
TUCSA to where  they could  get  information  which  they needed  (African  American  Labour 
Center,  6  January 1972).  In  1967,  for  example,  Splain,  who was  a  labour  expert  in  the  US 
Embassy  in  South  Africa,  made  a  tour,  of  which  the  aim was to  meet  trade  unionists  from 
TUCSA, to the Area Divisions of TUCSA including Western Province Area Division, Eastern 
Province Area Division, Border Area Division and Natal Area Division. All the arrangements of 
the tour  were organized by TUCSA (Letter  from L.  Douwes Dekker to  E.H.Splain,  23 June 
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1967). In the same year, Senator Robert Kennedy from the US visited South Africa and had a 
meeting with leading members of TUCSA including the president L.C. Scheepers; the General 
Secretary J.A. Grobbelear; the members of Officers’ Committee, J. Daniel, T.M.M Alexander, 
B.J.Erasmus; James Mafuna, from the Engineering Industrial Workers’ Union, Lucy Mvubelo, 
from the National Union of Clothing Workers and Sybil  Hedley,  from the Garment  Workers 
Union (NEC Report, 13th Annual Conference, 1967). 
During  the  1960s  and  1970s,  many  American  institutions,  academics,  experts  and 
researchers  having  relations  with the  AFL-CIO conducted  research  projects  about  the labour 
movement,  industrial  system  and  political  environment  of  South  Africa.  For  them,  the  first 
information  source  in  South  Africa  was  TUCSA.  This  meant  that  the  AFL-CIO,  other  US 
institutions and researchers from the US tried to understand the labour movement of South Africa 
from the TUCSA’s point of view. For instance, in 1965, Bush Kimberley, an academic from the 
US, conducted a study about the labour movement of South Africa and asked some questions to 
the General Secretary of TUCSA, Grobbelear, by sending a letter. In his response, Grobbelear 
provided TUCSA as the largest and most representative labour organization of South Africa by 
pointing out that SACTU was exposed to communist infiltration and FOFATUSA was only the 
representative of black workers of the country.  Of course, he never mentioned discriminatory 
history of TUCSA or the privileged positions of the whites within TUCSA unions:     
This council is the largest and most representative coordinating body of trade unions, with the  
Federation of Free African Trade Unions, functioning as an organization which caters solely for  
African members… Due to the extreme left wing policy, and what appears to be communistic  
infiltration, SACTU has received considerable attention from the South African government, and  
the security police… The Federation of Free Trade Unions is also in a rather difficult position,  
mainly due to the fact that the African trade unions do not seem to be mature enough… It is the  
intention of my council to intensify its effort to organize all unorganized workers…This council  
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has, however, continued to function as non-racial organization… (Letter From Grobbelear to  
Kimberley, 16 August 1965).
   
In addition,  TUCSA sent different information resources including conference reports, 
documents, resolutions taken in different activities etc. to the AFL-CIO and other US institutions, 
such as the US Embassy in South Africa. For instance, in 1960, TUCSA’s conference reports, 
South African Trades and Labour conferences reports and the Trade Union Unity Conference 
reports were sent to the US embassy by TUCSA (Letter from General Secretary of TUCSA to 
A.J. Tressider Public Affairs Officer of American Embassy, 14 July 1960). In 1968, information 
about  an  agreement  between  trade  unions  and employers  in  the  iron,  steel,  engineering  and 
metallurgical industry was sent to the labour officer in the American consulate in Johannesburg 
(Letter from TUCSA to E.J. McHale, 1 July 1968). In the same year, following the request of US 
consulate  in  Johannesburg,  selected  examples  of  wage  levels,  including  those  of  the  South 
African Prime Minister, the members of Parliament, assistants considering gender and ethnicity, 
and clerks in different industries including commerce and , building, engineering, were sent to the 
US embassy (Letter from R.L. Kraf to E.J. McHale, 9 December 1968). Even the biographies of 
TUCSA  members  were  sent  to  the  US  embassy  in  South  Africa  (Letter  from  Terence  P. 
O’Donoghue to R.M. Long, Without Date).  
Another  dimension  of  the  relations  between  TUCSA  and  the  AFL-CIO  was  the 
educational programs organized by the AALC in South Africa. For instance, in 1971, the AALC 
decided to launch a training course for African workers in South Africa in collaboration with 
TUCSA (African American Labour Center, 6 January 1972). The administrator of AALC, Irving 
Brown, asked TUCSA’s opinion about what was needed by sending a letter to Grobbelear. In his 
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response,  pointing out that  TUCSA was ready to collaborate  with the AFL-CIO and AALC, 
Grobbelear stated that what was necessary was the formation of education centers, which would 
allow workers to gain an appreciation of the trade union movements; the education of officials for 
the labour movement;  and equipping officials in the movement.  According to Grobbelear, the 
first step of such an education program had to be education of Africans in terms of industrial 
legislation and other legislation (Letter From Grobbelear to Brown, 19 March 1972). 
In  the  same  year,  the  AALC  decided  to  organize  another  education  program  in 
collaboration with the US government, a university from the US and TUCSA in the Graduate 
School of Business Administration at the Wits University. The aim of the program was to invite 
some  American  labour  consultants  and  the  representatives  of  American  labour  as  visiting 
professors  (African  American  Labour  Center,  11  October  1972).  However,  the  program was 
postponed by the school because such a program could be against the South African Legislation. 
In addition, the University also pointed out that they did not have a budget for such an activity 
(Letter  From  Grobbelear  to  Spatz,  20 October  1972;  African  American  Labour  Center,  11 
October 1972). 
During  the  1960s  and  1970s,  many  US  institutions  including  universities  organized 
educational  activities in collaboration with the AFL-CIO in the US and many unionists from 
TUCSA attended these activities.  One of them was the Trade Union Program at the Harvard 
University.  According to the official description of the program, it was organized  “…for the 
purpose of educating to trade unions the same basic training in administration available to men in 
the field of business management” (TUCSA Newsletter, August 1965). In other words, the basic 
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aim of the program was to spread the idea of bread-and- butter or business unionism among trade 
unionist coming from different countries. Another indicator of such an argument was that George 
Meany, who was the leader of the AFL-CIO, and Walter Reuther, who was the leader of the 
United Automobile Workers Union (UAW), which was one of the most important union in the 
AFL-CIO in terms of foreign policy and overseas programs, were on the advisory committee of 
the program (Harvard University Trade Union Program, 15 March 1963). 
The  program  was  organized  under  the  administration  of  the  Bureau  of  International 
Labour Affairs of the Department of Labour. It was organized as two sessions -spring and fall- 
and consisted of three months training and two months travel for the purpose of learning about 
the US, and accepted 28 trade unionists from different countries. The other half of participants 
was from the US. The spring session would be held in the period between the 20th of February 
and  the  17th of  May  and  the  fall  session  would  be  held  in  the  period  between  the  11th of 
September and the 6th of December. 
The international participants of the program were granted first class jet travel with 35 
pounds excess baggage on their return flight from their countries to the US. The program also 
covered domestic travel in the US with same conditions. In addition, all participants were given 
$15 per diem and $50 allowance for incidental expenses during their stay in the US. Additionally, 
tuition fee of the course, $770 per person, was paid by the United States Government (Letter 
From Terence P. O’Donoghue to Ed. Splain 25 October 1962; Letter From Ed. Splain, to Terence 
17 October 1962). 
There were a number of criteria, which participants had to comply with. Accordingly, 
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o They had to be trade union officials or labour educators, but they could not be 
government officials,
o They had to be knowledgeable about the labour area, 
o  They  had  to  indicate  their  desire  to  maintain  a  career   in  the  trade  union 
movement, 
o They had to have successful experience in the labour movement,
o They had to speak  English and know industrial relations (Letter from Ed. Splain 
to Terence P. O’Donoghue, 25 October 1962) 
However, these were only official requirements. Embassies circulating the invitation of 
the program to potential trade unions demanded more information. For instance, Splain circulated 
the  criteria  of  the  1963 Harvard  Program to  TUCSA,  pointing  out  criteria  like  being  South 
African  citizen,  good  health  and  moral  character,  proficiency  in  English,  experience,  being 
emotionally and intellectually mature. Besides, he demanded some supplementary information, 
such  as  personality,  political  leanings,  attitudes,  feeling  towards  the  US,  in  addition  to 
biographical data (Letter From Ed. Splain to Terence, 17 October 1962). 
As for the lectures of the program, they consisted of following headings: Problems in 
Labour Relations, Economic Analysis, Labour Law and Arbitration, Trade Union Administration, 
Wage Administration and Benefits, America Labour History, International Labour Affairs, Public 
Spending and Parliamentary Procedure, Collective Bargaining. According to the requirements of 
the program,  the participants  would report  directly to  Washington after  the program finished 
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(Letter  from Ed. Splain to Terence P. O’Donoghue, October 1962; Circular  No. 20,  19 June 
1963).
 During the program, in addition to the lectures at the Harvard University, the participants 
had meetings with different US institutions, including the Department of State, the Department of 
Labour, the AFL-CIO officials, the National Labour Board, and the US Congress etc (Letter from 
Ed.  Splain  to  Terence  P.  O’Donoghue,  25  October  1962).  In  addition,  participants  were 
encouraged  to  undertake  individual  travel  for  consultation  and  observation  in  the  US.  The 
program ended with a terminal seminar, evaluation and discussions on experiences (Letter from 
Ed. Splain to Terence P. O’Donoghue, 25 October 1962). 
Many TUCSA members and administrators attended these courses in different periods. In 
1963, four members of TUCSA, two members for each session, including Louis A. Petersen, the 
General Secretary of Garment Workers Union of the Western Provinces, attended the Harvard 
Trade  Union Course (Circular  No.  54/1962,  30 November  1962;  Letter  From Ed.  Splain,  to 
Terence O’Donoghue, 25 October 1962). Before Petersen went to the Harvard University,  US 
embassy wanted to have a talk with him (Letter to L.A. Petersen, 12 March 1963). For 1964 
program,  Sydney  John  Spear  from  the  South  African  Typographical  Union  (Bloemfontein 
Brunch) was selected as participant (Letter from P.O’Donoghue to E.H.Splain, 16 August 1963). 
In 1965, Christine Du Perez, General Secretary of the National Union of Cigarette and Tobacco 
Workers attended the program (TUCSA Newsletter August 1965). Her following words shows 
that  one  of  the  most  important  function  of  the  program was  to  import  US  trade  unionism 
understanding to the labour movements of other countries:    
What forcible struck me was how the trade unions are lagging behind management in education 
and training. I hope that I will be able to import something of what I learned to the South African  
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trade union movement here the TUCSA education programme is of vital importance (TUCSA 
Newsletter August, 1965).
Another activity organized by US institutions including the AFL-CIO was the US Foreign 
Leadership Grant, which was organized  and financed by the Trade Union Exchange Programs 
Division  of  the  US  Department  of  Labour  for  the  Office  of  African  Progress  of  the  US 
Department of State. The program included trade union visits, tours and meetings with different 
actors in the US (With the Compliments of the American Consulate General, without date and 
reference).  In  1964,  TUCSA  was  invited  to  send  its  members  to  the  program,  which  was 
organized in South Africa by Splain, who was labour officer in the US embassy (Letter from 
Grobbelear to the Secretary of National Union of Furniture and Allied Workers of South Africa, 
19 February 1965). As Grobbelear’s following words show, the invitation was warmly welcomed 
by TUCSA:  
This decision by the US authorities is not only an honour gained by this council, but also an 
honour to  your union,  since brother  Erasmus evidently  met  with  the  requirements  of  the  US 
authorities (Historical Papers, Cullen Library, AH 1426, Eb 4, 18/3/2, 17 June 1965).
Over the following years, many unionists from TUCSA attended the program. In 1965, 
for  example,  B.J.  Erasmus,  Trustees  of  the  TUCSA  and  the  president  of  the  Johannesburg 
Municipal  Transport  Workers  Union,  attended  the  program.  In  1966  and  1967,  the  General 
Secretary Grobbelear and the President Murray both attended (Historical Papers, Cullen Library, 
AH 1426, AV1, File 2, 8/24, 2 May 1967). 
During the program6, participants visited different cities in the US, including Washington, 
New  York,  Buffalo,  Detroit,  Michigan,  Chicago,  Illinois,  Phoenix,  Arizona,  Los  Angles, 
6 This is the 1965 program. However, the program had a similar content for other years. 
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California,  New  Orleans  and  Louisiana  (With  the  Compliments  of  the  American  Consulate 
General, Johannesburg, Document About Foreign Exchange Leadership Grant, without date and 
reference).  In  these  cities,  the  participants  had  meeting  with  different  officials  and  attended 
activities  organized  by  different  institutions  including  the  Trade  Union  Exchange  Program 
Division Bureau of International  Labour Affairs of the US Department  of Labour, Bureau of 
Educational  and  Cultural  Affairs  of  the  US  Department  of  State,  Executive  Director  of 
Washington International Center, Northern Virginia Center School of General Studies, Catholic 
University  of  America,  Jewish  Community  Council,   Foreign  Visitors  Office,  Amalgamated 
Transit  Union  AFL-CIO,  Special  International  Representative,  International  Association  of 
Machinists and Aero-plane Workers, Washington International Center, Embassy of South Africa, 
International Affairs Department of the AFL-CIO, the US Department of Health and Education, 
New York City Transit Authority, Transport Workers Union of America were some examples of 
these institutions (ibid). Some examples of the activities organized by these organizations were 
discussions about US governments and politics, family and community, religious life in the US, 
the structure and objective of the unions, developments on the national level and the effects of 
automatization on trade union membership, the history and structure of the AFL-CIO, the role of 
US labour movement in the international labour movement, social insurance (ibid). In addition, 
the participants met many trade unionists through this program. For example, during his tour, 
Grobbelear  met  with  Employee  Relations,  North  American  Aviation,  Los  Angeles  Division; 
President  of  Bricklayers,  Masons  and  Plasterers  International  Union  of  America;  Maritimes 
Trade  Department  of  AFL-CIO;  Assistant  to  President  of  International  Brotherhood  of 
Boilermakers,  Iron  Ship  Builders,  Blacksmiths,  Forges  and  Helpers;  the  president  of  the 
Amalgamated Society of Boilermakers,  Shipwrights, Blacksmiths and Structural  Workers and 
E.G.  Weishan  (Letter  from  Grobbelear  to  Montgomery,  19  September  1967;  Letter  from 
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Grobbelear   to  Thomas  F.  Murphy,  19 September  1967;  Letter  from Thomas  F.  Murphy to 
Grobbelear,  18 July 1967; Grobbelear to H.J. Buoy, 20 September 1967; Letter from Grobbelear 
to D. Mc Garvey, 20 September 1967).
By the beginning of the 1970s, the United States South Africa Leader Exchange Program 
(USSALEP) had organized different activities in South Africa, including academic activities and 
the visits of academics from the US. For instance, in 1966, USSALEP invited Prof. John James 
Jehring, who was the Director of Center for Productivity Motivation in the School of Commerce 
at the University of Wisconsin, to visit main centers in South Africa. The trip had three main 
objectives.  The  first  was  a  study  on  productivity  issues,  with  particular  focus  on  relations 
between  education  and  productivity,  financial  incentives,  and  creation  of  capital  and  social 
security.  The  second was  to  give  lectures  to  the  business  community  and academics  on  the 
importance of productivity, new approaches in the US, organizing economic enterprises, financial 
incentives for nonprofit organizations. The third aim of the visit was to contact with people from 
the  business  community,  governmental  agencies  and  trade  unions.  During  his  stay  in  South 
Africa, he also contacted and had meetings with Sphers and Grobbelear from TUCSA (Letter 
From Grobbelear to S.A. Program Director of USSALEP Inc., 25 February 1966; Letter From 
Moir to Murray, 19 January 1966; Letter from Grobbelear to SA Program Director of USSALEP, 
9 February 1966).       
In  1973,  the  USSALEP  organized  a  symposium  on  “the  Optimum  Involvement  of 
Manpower in Business and Industry” with particular focus on unskilled labour. Seventy people 
including  trade  unionists,  businessmen,  authorities  in  the  field  of  management  and  the 
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representatives of the government attended the symposium, of which twenty-five of participants 
were from the US. Two people were invited by W.I.Grobler, USSALEP South Africa Director, 
from  the  TUCSA:  Lucy  Mvubelo  and  Robert  Craft,  economist  and  the  Assistant  General 
Secretary of the TUCSA. Lucy Mvubelo took place in the plenary session of the symposium with 
economist  W.E.J.Steemkamp  and  business  executive  Bill  Willson while  Craft  made  a 
presentation  with  particular  focus  on  trade  unions  and  work  committees  on  “Training  and 
Communication” session (Letter from Grobler to Robert Kraft, 29 March 1973). 
In  1975,  Friends  of  the  USSALEP  meeting  was  held  in  Johannesburg  with  the 
participation of managers of US corporations  in South Africa.  Grobbelear from TUCSA also 
made  a  presentation  evaluating  the  situation  of  the  South  African  labour  movement  in  the 
meeting. In the same year, the USSALEP invited Ralph Seward, who was an arbitrator in the US, 
for a month visit. During his visits, he had many meetings with trade unionists and all contacts of 
him  with  trade  unionists  were  established  by  TUCSA  (United  States  South  Africa  Leader 
Exchange  Program  Inc.,  17  July  1975;  Letter  from Grobler,  SA  Director  of  USSALEP,  to 
Grobbelear, General Secretary of TUCSA, Historical Papers, Cullen Library, AH 1426 Eb 4, 6 
June 1975). 
Conclusion
This study aimed to understand US labour  relations  with South Africa with particular 
focus on the relations between TUCSA and the AFL-CIO in the period between 1960 and 1973. 
Therefore,  in  the  study,  firstly,  a  historical  framework  was  developed  to  understand  the 
restructuring process of capitalist production relations and international labour relations in the 
post Second World War era in the world scale and South Africa respectively. After this, overseas 
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labour  policies  in  a  general  context  and  US  overseas  labour  policies  in  South  Africa  with 
particular focus on the relations between TUCSA and AFL-CIO were dealt with. 
After  the  Second  World  War,  the  world  economy  was  restructured  because  of  the 
hegemonic  position  of  the  US  within  in  the  capitalist  world  economy.  However,  additional 
factors, such as political independence of former colonies, the existence of the Soviet Union as an 
alternative hegemonic power, the establishment of socialist governments in East Europe, and the 
increasing influence of left wing political parties in the Western Europe, also played a critical 
role in the Post Second World War era. As a result of these developments, the US tried to create 
new mechanisms to ensure its hegemonic position and the continuation of the capitalist mode of 
production.  The  first  step  of  these  attempts  was  the  establishment  of  international  financial 
institutions and the introducing of new regulations, such as the IMF, IBRD GATT and Marshall 
Plan to rebuild capitalist production relations around the world. The second attempt became the 
restructuring process of the international labour movement. In fact, the restructuring process of 
the international labour movement had begun with the formation of WFTU in 1945. However, 
since the most influential country within the WFTU was the Soviet Union, the US evaluated the 
WFTU as a threat to its hegemonic position and capitalism. Therefore, after the formation of 
WFTU, the US tried to undermine WFTU by playing a leading role in the formation process of 
ICFTU. As a result,  in 1949, under the leadership of the US and its  most  influential  labour 
organization, AFL, the ICFTU was established as a rival labour international. 
After  the Second World  War,  another  important  development  within  the  international 
labour  movement  was  the  evolution  of  the  overseas  labour  policies  of  developed  capitalist 
countries.  The  most  important  aim  of  these  policies  was  to  create  anti-communist  and  pro-
capitalist  labour  organizations  in  different  regions  where  developed  capitalist  countries  had 
investments. Therefore, during the period many regional labour organizations were established by 
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the developed capitalist countries in different regions, such as Latin America, Asia and Africa. Of 
course, the most important actor of this process was the US, as the hegemonic power of capitalist 
world economy. 
In 1960,  the  Inter American Regional  Labour Organization (ORIT),  which had strong 
relations with the governments, capitalist classes and intelligence services of Western capitalist 
countries, was established by the ICFTU in Latin America to  support non-communist and non-
political trade unionism in the region. During the 1960s and 1970s, it organized many activities 
aiming to support anti-communist trade unions in collaboration with the ICFTU, AFL-CIO and 
US, which was the most  influential  country in the ORIT’s policies  and activities  through its 
capitalist class and intelligence services. However, after the Cuban Revolution in 1960, the AFL-
CIO decided to form an independent regional labour organization in Latin America: AIFLD. It 
was also financed by US through the AFL-CIO, USAID, CIA and the business community of US. 
In addition, it played a significant role in creating non-political,  anti-communist,  pro-capitalist 
and pro-American labour organizations in the region. 
By the sixties, US investments began to increase in the African continent. However, at the 
beginning of the 1960s,  the AFL-CIO and US had no presence in the region.  Therefore,  the 
influence of ICFTU in the continent was very important for them in gaining a hegemonic position 
in the region. However, in 1964, the US launched its independent Africa program by forming the 
AALC. Like ORIT and the AIFLD, the AALC also organized many activities aiming to support 
non-political and anti-communist trade unions in different African countries in collaboration with 
US government, US capitalist class and the CIA.
From the beginning of the 1960s, US investments began to increase in South Africa as 
well. Therefore, US overseas policies in South Africa began to increase in the 1960s and 1970s. 
In  other  words,  by  the  beginning  of  the  1960s,  the  leading  organization  of  the  US  labour 
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movement, the AFL-CIO, attempted to extend its influence over the labour movement of South 
Africa, especially over TUCSA, which was the most suitable partner for the US and AFL-CIO 
because of its ideological position and stance relying on the idea of business unionism. 
The AFL-CIO maintained  its  relations  with  TUCSA directly  or  through  different  US 
institutions including the US State Department and US Labour Department. During the sixties 
and seventies, relations between the TUCSA and US labour/official organizations, especially the 
AFL-CIO, ranged from information sharing to organization of educational programs, overseas 
visits,  publication  sharing  and  academic  activities.  For  instance,  TUCSA always  had  strong 
relations with the labour experts employed by the US Embassy in South Africa and they played a 
significant  role  in  TUCSA’s  relations  with  the  AFL-CIO and other  US institutions.  Another 
example of the relations between TUCSA and the AFL-CIO was the formation of TUCSA’s 
research bureau and education department. AFL-CIO and labour experts coming from the US 
played a significant role in the formation of TUCSA’s research and education departments, which 
organized many activities against communism and political unionism in collaboration with the 
AFL-CIO. 
During the 1960s and 1970s, AFL-CIO sent many publications, documentaries, movies to 
TUCSA. At the same time, TUCSA was an important information source for the AFL-CIO. For 
instance, in the 1960s and 1970s, many people including academics, experts and researchers from 
the US visited South Africa to conduct research projects or contact with trade unionists. Almost 
every time, the first information source of them in South Africa was TUCSA. Similarly, during 
the period, many trade union courses aiming to spread bread and butter unionism in different 
countries through participants coming from these countries were organized by the AFL-CIO or in 
collaboration  with  the  AFL-CIO  in  the  US.  Many  TUCSA  members  including  its  general 
secretary, president and presidents of member unions attended these activities. Thanks to these 
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kinds of activities, they contacted with many people and established important relations in the 
US. 
All of these show that during the 1960s and the 1970s the AFL-CIO and US tried to shape 
and control the South African labour movement through TUCSA because it was the most suitable 
partner for US labour operations in South Africa because of its anti-communist stance and bread 
butter  unionism understanding.  To be sure,  from the US point of view, the basic aim of this 
policy  was  to  ensure  the  profitability  of  US  investments  and  the  continuation  of  capitalist 
production relations in South Africa. 
However,  these  kinds  of  relations  between  the  AFL-CIO  and  TUCSA  were  able  to 
continue until  the early 1970s because the emerging struggle of the blacks against  the racist 
policies of apartheid and Durban strike waves in 1973 negated AFL-CIO existing plans towards 
the  South  African  labour  movement.  Therefore,  by  the  late  1970s,  the  AFL-CIO  found  it 
necessary to change its policies and to begin to forge relations with the emerging black trade 
union movement of South Africa – but that is another chapter to this story which is beyond the 
scope of this thesis. 
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